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Abstract. Twin-Field (TF) quantum key distribution (QKD) represents a novel QKD approach whose
principal merit is to beat the point-to-point private capacity of a lossy quantum channel, thanks to
performing single-photon interference in an untrusted node. Indeed, recent security proofs of various
TF-QKD type protocols have confirmed that the secret key rate of these schemes scales essentially as
the square root of the transmittance of the channel. Here, we focus on the TF-QKD protocol introduced
by Curty et al., whose secret key rate is nearly an order of magnitude higher than previous solutions.
Its security relies on the estimation of the detection probabilities associated to various photon-number
states through the decoy-state method. We derive analytical bounds on these quantities assuming
that each party uses either two, three or four decoy intensity settings, and we investigate the protocol’s
performance in this scenario. Our simulations show that two decoy intensity settings are enough to beat
the point-to-point private capacity of the channel, and that the use of four decoys is already basically
optimal, in the sense that it almost reproduces the ideal scenario of infinite decoys. We also observe
that the protocol seems to be quite robust against intensity fluctuations of the optical pulses prepared
by the parties.
The last few decades have witnessed major advancements in the field of quantum communication [1, 2],
with quantum key distribution (QKD) [3–13] being its most developed application. Recent experiments
over about 400 km of optical fibers [14, 15] and over about 1000 km of satellite-to-ground links [16, 17]
demonstrated that QKD over long distances is possible. Despite such remarkable experimental achieve-
ments, the private capacity of point-to-point QKD is intrinsically limited by fundamental bounds [18,19].
These bounds state that in the high-loss regime the key rate scales basically linearly with the transmit-
tance of the channel connecting the end-users Alice and Bob, i.e. it decreases exponentially with the total
channel length. This imposes strict practical constraints on the possibility of achieving point-to-point
QKD over arbitrary long distances.
A way to overcome this limitation is to employ one or more intermediate nodes in the quantum chan-
nel connecting the parties. For instance, the use of quantum repeaters [20] yields a polynomial scaling
of the communication efficiency with the distance [21]. Moreover, a quantum repeater scheme can be
arbitrarily iterated along the quantum channel, thus increasing in principle the total communication dis-
tance between Alice and Bob as much as desired. Unfortunately, however, quantum repeaters are very
challenging to build in practice with current technology: they either require quantum memories [20–22]
or quantum error correction [23, 24]. Of course, technology is improving, and quantum repeaters may
become viable in the future.
Other solutions, which attain a square-root improvement in the scaling of the key rate with respect to the
transmittance of the channel, are obtained by placing a single untrusted relay between Alice and Bob.
Such protocols include, for instance, Measurement-Device-Independent-QKD [6] (MDI-QKD) with quan-
tum memories [25, 26] and adaptive MDI-QKD featuring quantum non-demolition measurements [27].
The philosophy behind both types of protocols is that the central relay is able to adapt the pairings of
photons received from Alice and Bob to the photon losses. In this way, for every signal sent by Alice
and Bob to the central relay, just one of the two signals is required to arrive, leading to the mentioned
square-root improvement in the key rate scaling. However, both protocols still require two-photon in-
terference in the central node, as in the original MDI-QKD scheme [6]. More recently, [28] proposed
the Twin-Field (TF) QKD protocol, still characterized by an untrusted central node, and conjectured
a square-root improvement in the key rate scaling. This scaling has been later on confirmed in [29, 30]
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for two variants of the original scheme. The advantage of TF-QKD lies in the fact that it is designed to
generate key bits from single-photon interference in the central node, thus naturally retaining the scaling
with the square-root of the transmittance without the need to adapt to photon losses via sophisticated
devices.
Since the original proposal, there has been an intense research activity to develop different versions of
TF-QKD protocols equipped with their security proofs [29–33] as well as to investigate their experimental
feasibility [34–36]. Among these protocols, the one that seems to deliver the higher secret ket rate [37]
is that introduced in [33]. Its security relies on the ability to estimate the detection statistics (usually
called yields) of various Fock states sent by Alice and Bob through the decoy-state method [38–40]. The
key-rate simulations provided in [33] indeed exhibit an improved scaling with the loss, but the estimation
of the yields is only carried out by means of numerical tools based on linear programming and considering
only the case of three decoy intensity settings.
In this paper, we derive analytical bounds on the yields which are required to evaluate the key rate
formula of [33], assuming two, three and four decoy intensity settings. In so doing, we are able to show,
for instance, that the use of two decoy intensity settings is already enough to beat the point-to-point
private capacity bound reported in [19]. Also, we show that the use of four decoys is basically optimal
in the sense that the resulting secret key rate is already very close to the ideal scenario which assumes
infinite decoy intensity settings. Analytical bounds imply a fully-analytical expression for the protocol’s
secret key rate, which could be very convenient for performance optimization in scenarios where the
number of parameters is high, like for instance in finite-key security analyses. In addition, we study how
the performance of TF-QKD is affected under intensity fluctuations, which are inevitable in practice,
and we demonstrate that the protocol in [33] seems to be actually quite robust against such fluctuations.
Like in [33], for simplicity, here we focus on the asymptotic-key rate scenario. However, we remark that
by using the techniques reported in [41], it is cumbersome but straightforward to adapt our analytical
methods also to the finite-key rate scenario, where, as mentioned above, it becomes particularly useful
to have analytical bounds for the main quantities that enter the key rate formula.
The article is structured as follows. In Sec. 1 we present the TF protocol from [33] and highlight the
main yields that need to be bounded. In Sec. 2 we provide the analytical bounds on the yields for the
case of two decoys (the cases of three and four decoys are treated in Appendix C and Appendix D,
respectively). In Sec. 3 we provide simulations of the secret key rate versus the loss for a typical channel
model (briefly described in Appendix A), and we also evaluate the effect of intensity fluctuations. We
conclude the paper in Sec. 4.
1. The TF-QKD protocol
Alice
clicked / not clicked
clicked / not clicked
Bob
phase reference
Fig. 1: The Twin-Field QKD protocol introduced in [33].
As discussed above, we consider the TF-QKD protocol presented in [33] and sketched in figure 1. Alice
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and Bob establish a secret shared key by sending optical pulses to a central untrusted node, C. It is
assumed that the node C shares a phase reference with Alice and Bob, which can be achieved by the
transmission of strong optical pulses. The protocol is composed of the following five steps:
(i) Alice (Bob) chooses the X-basis with probability pX and the Z-basis with probability pZ = 1− pX .
Upon choosing the X-basis, Alice (Bob) prepares an optical pulse in a coherent state |α〉 or |−α〉
at random, corresponding to the key bit bA = 0 (bB = 0) or bA = 1 (bB = 1), respectively. Upon
choosing the Z-basis, she (he) prepares an optical pulse in a phase-randomized coherent state:
ρˆβA =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dθ|βAeiθ〉〈βAeiθ| =
∞∑
n=0
(β2A)
ne−β
2
A
n!
|n〉〈n| (1.1)
(ρˆβB ) whose intensity β
2
A (β
2
B) is drawn randomly from a set SA = {β2i }i (SB = {β2j }j) of real
nonnegative numbers.
(ii) Both parties send their optical pulses to the untrusted node C via optical channels in a synchronized
manner.
(iii) The central node C applies a balanced beamsplitter to the incoming pulses and features two threshold
detectors at its output ports. The detector placed at the output port associated to constructive
(destructive) interference is denoted by Dc (Dd).
(iv) The node C announces the measurement outcome kc (kd) of detector Dc (Dd), with kc = 0 and
kc = 1 (kd = 0 and kd = 1) corresponding to a no-click and a click event, respectively.
(v) Alice and Bob form their raw keys with the bits bA and bB collected when both parties chose the
X-basis and node C reported a click in only one detector (kc + kd = 1). Bob flips his bits bB for
which the click occurred in Dd.
1.1. Secret key rate formula
The security analysis performed in [33] yields the following lower bound on the asymptotic key rate R:
R ≥ max{R10, 0}+ max{R01, 0} , (1.2)
where the terms Rkckd , for (kc, kd) ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1)}, are defined as:
Rkckd = p
2
X p(kc, kd)
[
1− f h(ekckd)− h(ephkckd)
]
, (1.3)
with h(x) = −x log2 x− (1−x) log2(1−x) being the binary entropy function, f the inefficiency function
associated to error correction, and p(kc, kd) the conditional probability that node C announces the
outcome (kc, kd) when both parties selected the X-basis. The probability p(kc, kd) can be expressed as:
p(kc, kd) =
1∑
bA,bB=0
p(bA, bB)p(kc, kd|bA, bB) , (1.4)
where p(bA, bB) is the joint probability of Alice and Bob preparing the coherent states |(−1)bAα〉 and
|(−1)bBα〉, respectively. According to the protocol description above, we have: p(bA, bB) = 1/4 ∀ bA, bB .
p(kc, kd|bA, bB) instead denotes the conditional probability that node C announced (kc, kd) given that
Alice and Bob sent the coherent states |(−1)bAα〉 and |(−1)bBα〉, respectively. Since we consider
the asymptotic key-rate scenario, we assume that p(kc, kd|bA, bB) coincides with the correspondent
distribution observed by the parties.
Finally, the terms ekckd and e
ph
kckd
in (1.3) represent the bit-error rate in the X-basis and an upper bound
on the phase-error rate, respectively. The former is defined as:
e10 =
∑1
i,j=0|i⊕j=1 p(bA = i, bB = j) p(kc = 1, kd = 0|bA = i, bB = j)
p(kc = 1, kd = 0)
, (1.5)
e01 =
∑1
i=0 p(bA = i, bB = i) p(kc = 0, kd = 1|bA = i, bB = i)
p(kc = 0, kd = 1)
, (1.6)
and the latter as:
ephkckd =
1
p(kc, kd)
( ∞∑
n,m=0
c2nc2m
√
Y kc,kd2n 2m
)2
+
( ∞∑
n,m=0
c2n+1c2m+1
√
Y kc,kd2n+1 2m+1
)2 , (1.7)
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where the coefficients cn are defined as cn = e
−α2
2 αn/
√
n! and the yields Y kc,kdnm are the conditional
probabilities that node C announces the outcome (kc, kd) given that Alice and Bob emitted an n-photon
state and an m-photon state, respectively. Note that the only yields contributing to (1.7) are those
Y kc,kdnm such that n+m is an even number.
The yields Y kc,kdnm are quantities that are not directly observed by the parties, however they can be
estimated either numerically or analytically with techniques based on the decoy-state method [38–40].
Here we consider the analytical approach. In particular, we assume that Alice and Bob have at their
disposal either two, three or four decoy intensity settings when choosing the Z-basis. To each further
decoy intensity correspond additional linear constraints on the yields, leading to tighter estimations of
Y kc,kdnm and thus to a higher key rate. However, a finite number of decoys only allows to derive non-trivial
upper bounds‡ on a limited number of yields in (1.7), whereas the other yields are set to 1. Nevertheless,
even bounding just four yields in a non-trivial way is enough for the secret key rate to beat the point-
to-point private capacity bound (PLOB bound) [19] at high losses (see Sec. 3). Also, as we show below,
with four decoy intensity settings one can already obtain a secret key rate very close to that achievable
with infinite decoy intensity settings.
We remark that standard decoy-state-based QKD protocols require to lower bound the value of a
few yields (typically those associated to vacuum and single-photon pulses) [42], while the TF-QKD
protocol considered here upper bounds the value of the phase-error rate (1.7) by upper bounding several
yields. In particular, we upper bound the yields Y kc,kdnm for (n,m) ∈ I, where I is a certain subset of
{(n,m)|n,m ∈ N0} which depends on the number of decoys. Thanks to the derived upper bounds on the
yields (which we shall denote by Y U, kc,kdnm ) we are able to estimate the phase error rate (1.7) as follows:
ephkckd ≤
1
p(kc, kd)

 ∑
(2n,2m)∈I
c2nc2m
√
Y U, kc,kd2n 2m +
∑
(2n,2m)/∈I
c2nc2m
2
+
 ∑
(2n+1,2m+1)∈I
c2n+1c2m+1
√
Y U, kc,kd2n+1 2m+1 +
∑
(2n+1,2m+1)/∈I
c2n+1c2m+1
2
 . (1.8)
2. Yields estimation
When both Alice and Bob choose the Z-basis in the first step of the TF-QKD protocol, they prepare
phase-randomized coherent states with intensities β2A and β
2
B , respectively, and send them to C. From
Eve’s viewpoint, she cannot distinguish this scenario from the case in which the parties prepared number
states |n〉 and |m〉 according to the Poissonian distributions Pβ2A(n) and Pβ2B (m) (see Eq. 1.1), where
Pµ(n) = e
−µµn/n!. Therefore Eve’s attack can only depend on the number states |n〉 and |m〉 but not
on the signals’ intensities β2A and β
2
B . As a consequence, the probability that Eve announces outcomes
(kc, kd) only depends on the number of photons (n,m) she received from Alice and Bob, i.e. the yields
Y kc,kdnm are independent of the decoy intensities chosen by the parties.
For this reason, one can derive a set of linear constraints on the yields Y kc,kdnm by expressing the
experimentally observed gains Q
β2A,β
2
B
kc,kd
–which are defined as the conditional probabilities that node
C announced the outcome (kc, kd) given that Alice and Bob sent phase-randomized coherent states of
intensities β2A and β
2
B , respectively– in terms of the yields:
Q
β2A,β
2
B
kc,kd
=
∞∑
n,m=0
e−β
2
A−β2B (β
2
A)
n(β2B)
m
n!m!
Y kc,kdnm . (2.1)
As it is clear from (2.1), to every distinct pair of decoy intensities (β2A, β
2
B) corresponds a new constraint
on the set of infinite yields {Y kc,kdnm }n,m, which leads to tighter upper bounds and thus to a higher secret
key rate. On the other hand, having a large number of decoy intensities is experimentally demanding,
hence the need to derive the tightest possible bounds on the yields with a limited number of decoys.
In this Section we present a simple analytical method to obtain tight bounds on the yields of largest
‡ Every yield is a probability, thus it is trivially bounded by 1.
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contribution§ in (1.7) –i.e. relative to the largest coefficients cn– when the parties use two intensity
settings in the Z-basis. It is basically a Gaussian elimination-type technique but involving infinite-size
coefficient matrices. In particular, the guiding principle that we use is to combine the constraints (2.1)
so that in the resulting expression the yield to be bounded is the one with the largest coefficient, while
the yields which had larger coefficients in the initial constraints have been removed in the combination.
However, in some cases it turns out that is not possible to remove all the yields with larger coefficients
than the one to be bounded, due to a lack of decoy intensity settings (i.e. constraints). In other cases,
we manage to remove from the resulting expression even some yields which had a smaller coefficient than
the one to be bounded. Such a procedure can be readily extended to the case of three and four decoy
intensity settings. The results for these last two cases are presented in Appendix C and Appendix D,
respectively.
From now on, we assume that both optical channels linking the parties to the central node C have the
same transmittance
√
η. Therefore the set of optimal decoy intensities β2A and β
2
B is the same for both
parties [43] and we define it as: {µ0, µ1}. In order to simplify the notation, we also omit the measurement
outcome (kc, kd) from the constraints given by (2.1). Hence the yields are subjected to the following four
equality constraints:
Q˜k,l ≡ eµk+µlQk,l =
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
µk
nµl
m k, l ∈ {0, 1} , (2.2)
and to the inequality constraints:
0 ≤ Ynm ≤ 1 ∀n,m . (2.3)
Below we derive upper bounds on the yields: Y00, Y11, Y02 and Y20.
2.1. Upper bound on Y11
Consider the following combination of gains:
G11 = Q˜
0,0 + Q˜1,1 − (Q˜0,1 + Q˜1,0)
=
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
(µn0 − µn1 ) (µm0 − µm1 ) . (2.4)
The subscript in G11 indicates the yield that is going to be bounded with this combination of gains. In
(2.4) the coefficients of the yields Y0m and Yn0, for any n and m, are identically zero. Thus (2.4) can be
rewritten as:
G11 = Y11(µ0 − µ1)2 +
∞∑
n,m=1
n+m>2
Ynm
n!m!
(µn0 − µn1 ) (µm0 − µm1 ) . (2.5)
We observe that the coefficients that multiply the yields Ynm are always positive, being the product of
two factors of equal sign. A valid upper bound for Y11 is obtained considering the worst-case scenario
for the other yields, taking into account that (2.3) holds. Since all the yields’ coefficients carry the same
sign in (2.5) –regardless of the relation between µ0 and µ1–, the yield Y11 is maximal when all the other
yields are minimal. Thus the upper bound on Y11 is extracted by setting all the other yields to zero in
(2.5):
Y U11 =
G11
(µ0 − µ1)2 , (2.6)
where G11 is defined in (2.4).
We remark that by combining the gains as in (2.4), we manage to obtain a closed expression for Y11 in
which the contribution of all the yields Y0m and Yn0 is removed. Additionally, Y11 is now the yield with
the “highest weight” in (2.5) since it has the largest coefficient. All the yields’ bounds presented in this
work follow the same philosophy.
§ The same method can –in principle– be applied to any yield, however the limited number of decoy settings prevents from
obtaining a non-trivial bound on every yield.
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2.2. Upper bound on Y02
Consider the following combination of gains:
G02 = µ1Q˜
0,0 + µ0Q˜
1,1 − µ1Q˜0,1 − µ0Q˜1,0
=
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
(µ1µ
n
0 − µ0µn1 ) (µm0 − µm1 ) . (2.7)
In (2.7) the coefficients of the yields Yn0 and Y1m are identically zero. Thus (2.7) can be rewritten as:
G02 = − Y01(µ0 − µ1)2 − Y02
2
(µ0 + µ1)(µ0 − µ1)2 −
∞∑
m=3
Y0m
m!
(µ0 − µ1)(µm0 − µm1 )
+
∞∑
n=2
m=1
Ynm
n!m!
µ0µ1
(
µn−10 − µn−11
)
(µm0 − µm1 ) . (2.8)
Like in the derivation of Y11’s bound given by (2.6), a valid upper bound for Y02 is obtained by considering
the worst-case scenario for the remaining yields in (2.8). More specifically, Y02 is maximal when the yields
whose coefficient has the same sign as Y02’s coefficient are minimal, and the yields whose coefficient has
opposite sign to Y02’s are maximal. Recalling constraint (2.3), this means setting Y01 and Y0m to zero
and Ynm with n ≥ 2 and m ≥ 1, to 1 in (2.8). In so doing, after rearranging the terms we obtain:
Y U02 =
2
(µ0 + µ1)(µ0 − µ1)2
[
−G02 +
( ∞∑
m=1
µm0
m!
− µ
m
1
m!
)( ∞∑
n=2
µ1
µn0
n!
− µ0µ
n
1
n!
)]
, (2.9)
which leads to the following upper bound on Y02:
Y U02 =
2 (eµ0 − eµ1) (µ0 − µ1 + µ1eµ0 − µ0eµ1)− 2G02
(µ0 + µ1)(µ0 − µ1)2 . (2.10)
2.3. Upper bound on Y20
Consider the following combination of gains:
G20 = µ1Q˜
0,0 + µ0Q˜
1,1 − µ0Q˜0,1 − µ1Q˜1,0
=
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
(µn0 − µn1 ) (µ1µm0 − µ0µm1 ) . (2.11)
In (2.11) the coefficients of the yields Yn1 and Y0m are identically zero. Thus (2.11) can be rewritten as:
G20 = − Y10(µ0 − µ1)2 − Y20
2
(µ0 + µ1)(µ0 − µ1)2 −
∞∑
n=3
Yn0
n!
(µ0 − µ1)(µn0 − µn1 )
+
∞∑
n=1
m=2
Ynm
n!m!
µ0µ1 (µ
n
0 − µn1 )
(
µm−10 − µm−11
)
. (2.12)
A valid upper bound for Y20 is obtained by setting to zero the yields whose coefficient has the same sign
as Y20’s coefficient, and by setting to 1 the yields whose coefficient has opposite sign to Y20’s. In the case
of (2.12) this means setting Y10 and Yn0 to zero and Ynm with n ≥ 1 and m ≥ 2, to 1. In this way we
obtain:
Y U20 =
2
(µ0 + µ1)(µ0 − µ1)2
[
−G20 +
( ∞∑
n=1
µn0
n!
− µ
n
1
n!
)( ∞∑
m=2
µ1
µm0
m!
− µ0µ
m
1
m!
)]
, (2.13)
which leads to the following upper bound on Y20:
Y U20 =
2 (eµ0 − eµ1) (µ0 − µ1 + µ1eµ0 − µ0eµ1)− 2G20
(µ0 + µ1)(µ0 − µ1)2 . (2.14)
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2.4. Upper bound on Y00
Consider the following combination of gains:
G00 = µ
2
1Q˜
0,0 + µ20Q˜
1,1 − µ0µ1(Q˜0,1 + Q˜1,0)
=
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
(µn0µ1 − µ0µn1 ) (µm0 µ1 − µ0µm1 ) . (2.15)
In (2.15) the coefficients of the yields Y1m and Yn1, for any n and m, are identically zero. Thus (2.15)
can be rewritten as:
G00 = Y00(µ0 − µ1)2 − µ0µ1(µ0 − µ1)
[ ∞∑
m=2
Y0m
m!
(µm−10 − µm−11 ) +
∞∑
n=2
Yn0
n!
(µn−10 − µn−11 )
]
+ µ20µ
2
1
∞∑
n,m=2
Ynm
n!m!
(µn−10 − µn−11 )(µm−10 − µm−11 ) . (2.16)
As usual we extract an upper bound on Y00 by setting to their lowest value the yields whose coefficient
has the same sign as Y00’s coefficient (which correspond to the Ynm with n,m ≥ 2), and by setting to
their maximum value the yields whose coefficient has opposite sign to Y00’s coefficient (which correspond
to Y0m and Yn0). We know that every yield is trivially bounded by (2.3). However, in order to derive
a tighter bound on Y00, we employ non-trivial bounds for all the yields Ynm with n + m ≤ 4 in (2.16).
The upper bound on Y00 thus satisfies:
G00 = Y
U
00(µ0 − µ1)2 − µ0µ1(µ0 − µ1)
[
(µ0 − µ1)
2
(Y U02 + Y
U
20) +
(µ20 − µ21)
6
(Y U03 + Y
U
30)
+
(µ30 − µ31)
24
(Y U04 + Y
U
40) + 2
∞∑
n=5
(µn−10 − µn−11 )
n!
]
+
µ20µ
2
1(µ0 − µ1)2
4
Y L22 . (2.17)
In this equation Y Uij are upper bounds and Y
L
ij are lower bounds. From (2.17) we obtain the following
upper bound on Y00:
Y U00 =
G00
(µ0 − µ1)2 +
µ0µ1
µ0 − µ1
[
(µ0 − µ1)
2
(Y U02 + Y
U
20) +
(µ20 − µ21)
6
(Y U03 + Y
U
30) +
(µ30 − µ31)
24
(Y U04 + Y
U
40)
]
+
2
µ0 − µ1
[
µ1
(
eµ0 − 1− µ
2
0
2
− µ
3
0
6
− µ
4
0
24
)
− µ0
(
eµ1 − 1− µ
2
1
2
− µ
3
1
6
− µ
4
1
24
)]
− µ
2
0µ
2
1
4
Y L22 . (2.18)
where Y U02 and Y
U
20 are given in (2.10) and (2.14), respectively. The expressions for Y
U
03 and Y
U
04 in (2.18)
can be found by starting from the same expression (2.8) that we used to derive Y U02 , i.e.:
G02 = −
∞∑
m=1
Y0m
m!
(µ0 − µ1)(µm0 − µm1 ) +
∞∑
n=2
m=1
Ynm
n!m!
µ0µ1
(
µn−10 − µn−11
)
(µm0 − µm1 ) . (2.19)
From this expression we can extract an upper bound on any generic Y0m as follows:
Y U0m = min
{
m!
(µ0 − µ1)(µm0 − µm1 )
[−G02 + (eµ0 − eµ1)(µ0 − µ1 + µ1eµ0 − µ0eµ1)] , 1
}
, (2.20)
where we employ the constraint (2.3). Similarly, the expressions for Y U30 and Y
U
40 are obtained starting
from (2.12) and deriving an upper bound on a generic Yn0 as follows:
Y Un0 = min
{
n!
(µ0 − µ1)(µn0 − µn1 )
[−G20 + (eµ0 − eµ1)(µ0 − µ1 + µ1eµ0 − µ0eµ1)] , 1
}
. (2.21)
At last, the expression for Y L22 can be derived from the same combination of yields which led to Y
U
11 . In
particular, from (2.5) we have that:
G11 =
∞∑
n,m=1
Ynm
n!m!
(µn0 − µn1 ) (µm0 − µm1 ) .
Then, by setting to 1 all the yields whose coefficient has equal sign to Y22’s we obtain:
G11 =
∞∑
n,m=1
µn0 − µn1
n!
µm0 − µm1
m!
− (µ
2
0 − µ21)2
4
+
(µ20 − µ21)2
4
Y L22 , (2.22)
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which yields:
Y L22 = max
{
4
(µ0 − µ1)2(µ0 + µ1)2
[
G11 − (eµ0 − eµ1)2
]
+ 1 , 0
}
. (2.23)
Note that the upper bounds derived on Y04 and Y40 in this Section could be used to improve the estimation
of the phase error rate given by (1.8). However, the resulting improvement in the secret key rate would
be extremely small in this case and we neglect it for simplicity.
3. Simulations
In this Section we provide plots of the secret key rate given by (1.2) against the overall loss (−10 log10 η)
measured in dB of the two optical channels linking Alice and Bob to node C. The channel model we
use to simulate the quantities that would be observed experimentally –i.e. the gains p(kc, kd|bA, bB) and
Q
β2A,β
2
B
kc,kd
– is given in Appendix A [33]. It accounts for: the loss in the optical channels together with the
non-unity detection efficiency of Dc and Dd (altogether described by the parameter η), the polarization
and phase misalignments introduced by the channel and a dark count probability pd in each detector.
For concreteness, in all the plots below we assume fixed polarization and phase misalignments of 2%,
independently of the channel loss. Note that, as pointed out in [33], the TF-QKD protocol analyzed in
this work is quite robust against phase mismatch. This is so because phase misalignment only affects
the quantum bit error rate but not the phase error rate.
For illustration purposes every plot is obtained for three different values of the dark count rate of the
detectors, pd ∈ {10−6, 10−7, 10−8}. The plots are obtained by numerically optimizing‖ the secret key
rate –for every value of the loss– over the signal intensity (α2) and over one decoy intensity, while for
simplicity the other decoy intensities are fixed to near-to-optimal values for all values of the overall
loss. More specifically, we preliminarily performed an optimization of the key rate over the whole set of
intensity settings and noticed that most of the decoy intensities are roughly constant with the loss and
tend to be as low as possible. For instance, if we consider the case with two decoy intensity settings (µ0
and µ1, with µ0 > µ1), we observe that the optimal value for the weakest decoy µ1 is basically the lowest
possible for any value of the loss. In practice, however, it might be difficult to generate very weak signals
due to the finite extinction ratio of a practical intensity modulator [44], so we fix µ1 to a reasonable
small value from an experimental point of view, say µ1 = 10
−5 [34, 36], while keeping the optimization
over the remaining intensities. Similarly, if we consider the case with three decoy intensity settings (µ0,
µ1 and µ2, with µ0 > µ1 > µ2), we find that the optimal values for the weakest decoys µ1 and µ2
are also the lowest possible for any value of the loss. Moreover, in this last case, we show in Appendix
B that the system performance remains basically unchanged if one increases the value of the weakest
intensity to say µ2 = 10
−3, which might be even easier to implement experimentally than 10−5. Thus,
we fix µ2 = 10
−3 and we differentiate it from µ1 by, for example, one order of magnitude (i.e. we take
µ1 = 10
−2). The same argument holds in the case with four decoy intensity settings (see Appendix B),
where we fix µ2 = 10
−3, µ1 = 10−2, and µ0 = 10−1. We remark, however, that our method is general in
the sense that the analytical upper bounds on the yields can be evaluated with any desired combination
of intensity settings, while we select these particular decoy intensity values only for illustration purposes.
Also, let us emphasize that the optimal decoy intensity values in the finite-key regime might be different
from the values mentioned above. The analysis of the finite-key regime is, however, beyond the scope
of this paper. Importantly, it turns out that the resulting asymptotic secret key rates in these scenarios
are almost indistinguishable from those obtained by optimizing the value of all the intensity settings.
The optimal values of the signal and decoy intensities which are optimized as a function of the loss are
also plotted in this Section. In this regard, we also study how the key rate is affected when the intensities
are subjected to fluctuations around their optimal values in Subsec. 3.4.
3.1. Two decoy intensity settings
In figure 2 we plot the secret key rate against the overall loss for the case where Alice and Bob use two
decoy intensity settings each. The solid lines are obtained by bounding from above the yields Y00, Y02, Y20
and Y11 by means of the expressions derived in Sec. 2 and by optimizing the rate over the signal intensity
α2 and the decoy intensity µ0, while the other decoy intensity is fixed to µ1 = 10
−5 as explained above.
‖ The optimization is carried out by using the built-in function “NMaximize” of the software Wolfram Mathematica 10.0.
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Fig. 2: Secret key rate in logarithmic scale as a function of the overall loss in the channels Alice-C and Bob-C for
three different dark count rates (10−6 green, 10−7 red, 10−8 blue). The solid lines correspond to the case
where the yields Y00, Y02, Y20 and Y11 are estimated by means of two decoy intensity settings through the
bounds presented in Sec. 2 and the key rate is optimized over the signal intensity α2 (see figure 3a) and
the decoy intensity µ0 (see figure 3b). The other decoy intensity, µ1, is fixed to µ1 = 10
−5. The dashed
lines assume that all the yields are known from the channel model and the secret key rate is optimized over
α2. That is, these lines show the maximum value of the secret key rate which could be achieved with an
infinite number of decoy intensity settings and the security analysis reported in [33]. The solid magenta line
illustrates the PLOB bound [19]. The plot shows that in the presence of a dark count rate of at most about
pd = 10
−7 the protocol can beat the PLOB bound even with just two decoy intensity settings.
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(a) Optimal values of the signal intensity α2 as a
function of the loss between Alice and Bob for
three different dark count rates. These values are
obtained from the optimization of the secret key
rate (solid lines) of figure 2.
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(b) Optimal values of the decoy intensity µ0 as a
function of the loss between Alice and Bob for
three different dark count rates. These values are
obtained from the optimization of the secret key
rate (solid lines) of figure 2. The other decoy
intensity is set to: µ1 = 10
−5.
Fig. 3: Optimal values of the signal and decoy intensities α2 and µ0 for the TF-QKD protocol [33] when the parties
have at their disposal two decoy intensity settings to estimate the yields.
The optimal values for α2 and µ0 are shown in figure 3a and figure 3b, respectively. The dashed lines
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are instead obtained by employing the exact expression of the yields¶ which is given by (A.6) for the
channel model considered. This represents the ideal scenario in which the parties have an infinite number
of decoys through which they can estimate all the yields precisely. Note that in order to obtain the dashed
lines in figure 2 we use the exact expression of the yields Ynm only for n,m ≤ 12 while we set the other
yields to 1. This is enough to basically reproduce the behavior of the secret key rate when all the infinite
number of yields are computed via the channel model’s formula given by (A.6), as argued in [33]. The
dashed lines are only optimized over the signal intensity, since the yields are directly given by the channel
model. Finally, we also insert in figure 2 the PLOB bound on the secret key capacity [19], which reads
as follows in terms of the transmittance η :
K(η) = − log2(1− η) . (3.1)
In figure 2 we observe that even by means of just two decoy intensity settings the key rate can beat the
PLOB bound, provided that the dark count rate is pd . 10−7 . This happens because with two decoys
the parties can already non-trivially estimate the yields Ynm with n + m ≤ 2 as we showed in Sec. 2,
and these yields are the most relevant terms in the phase-error rate formula given by (1.7) [33]. Note
that we did not estimate the yields Y01 and Y10 since only the yields Ynm with n + m an even number
contribute to the phase-error rate (1.7).
However, figure 2 also shows that there is a sensible gap between the rates where the yields are estimated
with two decoys (solid lines) and the best possible rates one could achieve (dashed lines) if all the
yields were known. This clearly indicates that, although two decoys allow to estimate the yields of
largest contribution in the phase-error rate, such estimations are not sufficiently tight and the ability to
estimate a larger number of yields would increase the performance of the protocol.
By considering figure 3 and the fixed value of the decoy intensity µ1, one notices that the optimal
intensities are rather small and thus, in a real experimental implementation, intensity fluctuations might
be an issue. In Subsec. 3.4 we address this problem by studying how the key rate is affected under intensity
fluctuations and show that for fluctuations up to about 40% the change in the key rate performance is
minimal.
Also, we notice that the optimal values of the signal intensity α2 (see figure 3a) and the decoy intensity
µ0 (see figure 3b) are almost constant with the loss, for losses & 20 dB. This means that in a scenario
where the loss in the quantum channels varies dynamically with time within a reasonable interval, one
could still fix the signal intensity and both decoy intensities to constant values which happen to be close
to the optimal ones. This argument also holds in the case of three (see Subsec. 3.2) and four decoy
intensity settings (see Subsec. 3.3).
3.2. Three decoy intensity settings
In figure 4 we plot the secret key rate against the overall loss for the case where Alice and Bob use three
decoy intensity settings each. The solid lines are obtained by bounding from above the relevant yields
Ynm such thatn + m ≤ 4 (i.e. we upper bound the yields Y00, Y02, Y20, Y11, Y13, Y31, Y04, Y40 and Y22).
The exact expressions for the different upper bounds on the yields can be found in Appendix C, and we
omit them here for simplicity. The solid lines are optimized over the signal intensity α2 and the decoy
intensity µ0, while the weakest decoy intensities are fixed for simplicity to µ1 = 10
−2 and µ2 = 10−3.
As explained above, the resulting secret key rate in this scenario is almost indistinguishable from that
obtained by optimizing over all the intensity settings. The optimal values for α2 and µ0 are shown
in figure 5a and figure 5b, respectively. The dashed lines are again obtained by employing the exact
expression of the yields given by the channel model (A.6) and coincide with those plotted in figure 2.
We observe in figure 4 that the use of three decoys yields a significant improvement in the protocol’s
performance with respect to the two-decoys case (see figure 2). As a matter of fact, in figure 4 the solid
lines are almost overlapping the dashed lines for most values of the channel loss. This is due to the fact
that with three decoys the parties constrain the yields with nine independent equations (instead of four
equations as in the two-decoys case), which enable a tighter estimation of Y00, Y02, Y20 and Y11 and the
non-trivial estimation of five additional yields.
Moreover, in the case of three decoys the optimal signal intensity α2 (see figure 5a) is roughly double
the value of the correspondent intensity when using two decoys (see figure 3a). The reason for this is
connected to the role of α2 in the protocol’s key rate. In fact, the prefactor p(kc, kd) with kc + kd = 1 of
¶ By “exact expression” we mean that if the experimental apparatus were accurately described by the channel model in
Appendix A, then the yields associated to that experimental setup would be precisely predicted by (A.6).
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Fig. 4: Secret key rate in logarithmic scale as a function of the overall loss in the channels Alice-C and Bob-C for
three different dark count rates (10−6 green, 10−7 red, 10−8 blue). The solid lines correspond to the case
where the yields Y00, Y02, Y20, Y11, Y13, Y31, Y04, Y40 and Y22 are estimated by means of three decoy intensity
settings through the bounds presented in Appendix C and the key rate is optimized over the signal intensity α2
(see figure 5a) and the decoy intensity µ0 (see figure 5b). The other decoy intensities are fixed to µ1 = 10
−2
and µ2 = 10
−3. The dashed lines assume that all the yields are known from the channel model and the
secret key rate is optimized over α2. That is, these lines show the maximum value of the secret key rate
which could be achieved with an infinite number of decoy intensity settings and the security analysis reported
in [33]. The solid magenta line illustrates the PLOB bound [19]. The plot shows that already with three
decoy intensity settings the key rate (solid lines) is sensibly close to the ideal one in which all the yields are
known (dashed lines), meaning that the contribution of the other yields trivially bounded by 1 in the phase
error rate is minimal.
the key rate formula given by (1.3) increases for increasing α2: the higher the mean number of photons
sent by the parties (within certain limits) the higher the probability of having a click in one of the two
detectors. On the other hand, increasing α2 excessively also affects the phase-error rate. Note that by
setting some yields to 1 in the phase error rate formula given by (1.7) we give rise to addends like c2nc2m
and c2n+1c2m+1 which increase for increasing α
2, leading to an overall increase of the phase-error rate
and thus decrease of the key rate. The optimal value of α2 is thus given by the trade-off between the
effect of the prefactor p(kc, kd) and that of the terms c2nc2m and c2n+1c2m+1. Now, by noting that the
contribution of the therms c2nc2m and c2n+1c2m+1 decreases for increasing n,m, we understand that
their negative effect on the key rate is diminished in the case of three decoys since we non-trivially
estimate more yields, i.e. a lower number of yields is set to 1. This allows α2 to acquire higher values
with respect to the two-decoys case, as we observed in figure 5a.
Finally we point out that such an argument does not apply to the discussion about the optimal value of
the decoy intensity µ0 in the case of two and three decoys. As a matter of fact, the key rate does not
depend on the decoy intensities in the same way as on the signal intensity: the decoy intensities only
appear in the yields’ bounds inserted in the phase-error rate. Additionally, the analytical bounds on the
yields when using two or three decoys cannot be compared in a straightforward way. Nonetheless we
observe a similar behavior of the optimal µ0 for two (see figure 3b) and three decoys (see figure 5b).
3.3. Four decoy intensity settings
In figure 6 we plot the secret key rate against the overall loss for the case where Alice and Bob use four
decoy intensity settings each. Like in the three-decoys case, the solid lines are obtained by bounding from
above the yields Y00, Y02, Y20, Y11, Y13, Y31, Y04, Y40 and Y22 by means of four decoys. In particular, for the
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(a) Optimal values of the signal intensity α2 as a
function of the loss between Alice and Bob for
three different dark count rates. These values are
obtained from the optimization of the secret key rate
(solid lines) of figure 4. We observe that the optimal
signal intensity is roughly doubled with respect to
the two-decoys case (figure 3a).
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(b) Optimal values of the decoy intensity µ0 as a
function of the loss between Alice and Bob for
three different dark count rates. These values are
obtained from the optimization of the secret key
rate (solid lines) of figure 4. The other decoy
intensities are set to: µ1 = 10
−2 and µ2 = 10−3.
Fig. 5: Optimal values of the signal and decoy intensities α2 and µ0 for the TF-QKD protocol [33] when the parties
have at their disposal three decoy intensity settings to estimate the yields.
yields Y00, Y02, Y20, Y11 and Y22 we use the exact same analytical bounds derived with three decoys since
they are tight enough, and the use of a fourth decoy intensity would just make them more cumbersome
without providing a significant improvement of the resulting secret key rate. For the remaining four
yields we instead derived tighter bounds with the help of the fourth intensity µ3 (see Appendix D). The
solid lines are obtained by optimizing the rate over the signal intensity α2 and the fourth decoy intensity
µ3. It turns out that the optimal values for the other decoy intensities are basically the lowest possible for
any value of the loss, so, as explained above, for simplicity we fix the smallest one to an experimentally
reasonable small value (say µ2 = 10
−3), and then we differentiate it from the other two decoys, µ1 and
µ0, by one order of magnitude, i.e., we take µ1 = 10
−2 and µ0 = 10−1. Importantly, this decision has a
neglectable effect on the resulting secret key rate, when compared to that obtained by optimizing over
all intensity settings. The optimal values for α2 and µ3 are shown in figure 7a and figure 7b, respectively.
The dashed lines are the same as in figure 2 and figure 4.
With four decoys (see figure 6) the key rates basically reproduces the ideal ones (dashed lines) in which
all the yields are known, with the gap being at maximum of 1 dB at the very end of the plot lines (i.e.
in the very high loss regime). This demonstrates that there is no need to bound further yields than the
nine yields we bounded in the cases of three and four decoys. Of course, the tighter estimation of the
yields Y13, Y31, Y04 and Y40 achieved with four decoys results in an improvement of the key rate with
respect to the case of three decoys (see figure 4), especially in the region of high losses.
Concerning the optimal signal intensity (see figure 7a), we notice a slight increase with respect to the
three-decoys case (see figure 5a) due to the tighter estimation of some yields in the phase-error rate
formula, which allows their correspondent coefficients to acquire a slightly higher value under an increase
of α2.
Finally, the reason why the optimal µ3 plot (see figure 7b) looks quite different (with values above 1) from
the optimal µ0 plots for the cases of two and three decoys (see figure 3b and figure 5b) is the following.
In the TF-QKD protocol considered, the most important yields (i.e., those with a bigger impact on the
resulting phase error rate) are those associated to pairs of pulses with zero or with a very low number
of photons. It is therefore very important to be able to estimate these yields as tightly as possible. For
this, we have that the optimal intensities µ0 and µ1 (µ0, µ1 and µ2) for the case with two (three) decoys
are well below 1, just like in standard decoy-state QKD protocols [39,40]. However, as explained above,
here we use the intensity µ3 to improve the upper bounds for the yields Y13, Y31, Y04 and Y40. That
is, the intensity µ3 is only used to estimate yields associated to pairs of pulses with a total number of
photons equal to four. Thus, it is natural that the optimal value of µ3 is not too low and greater than 1.
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Fig. 6: Secret key rate in logarithmic scale as a function of the overall loss in the channels Alice-C and Bob-C
for three different dark count rates (10−6 green, 10−7 red, 10−8 blue). The solid lines correspond to the
case where the yields Y00, Y02, Y20, Y11 and Y22 are estimated by means of three decoys through the bounds
presented in Appendix C (i.e., for simplicity here we disregard the information provided by the additional
fourth decoy intensity setting) and Y13, Y31, Y04 and Y40 are estimated with four decoys via the bounds in
Appendix D. The key rate is optimized over the signal intensity α2 (see figure 7a) and the decoy intensity
µ3 (see figure 7b), while the other decoy intensities are fixed to µ0 = 10
−1, µ1 = 10−2 and µ2 = 10−3. The
dashed lines are optimized over α2 and assume that all the yields are known from the channel model. They
correspond to the maximum value of the secret key rate which could be achieved with an infinite number of
decoy intensity settings. The solid magenta line illustrates the PLOB bound [19]. The plot indicates that the
tighter estimation of the yields Y13, Y31, Y04 and Y40 with respect to the case of three decoy intensity settings
is enough to basically reproduce the ideal scenario in which all the yields are known (dashed lines).
3.4. Intensity fluctuations
Here we investigate the robustness of the TF-QKD protocol against intensity fluctuations that may occur
in the preparation of the pulses sent by Alice and Bob. This is motivated by the fact that the optimal
signal and decoy intensities that the parties should adopt in order to maximize the key rate for a given
loss are quite small, thus the effect of intensity fluctuations might be an issue in practice. On the other
hand, we also note that the optimal value of a given decoy or signal intensity is either constant or varies
very moderately with the loss.
Here we consider the simple scenario in which the intensity fluctuations are symmetric, i.e., we assume
that the intensity of Alice’s signal matches perfectly with the intensity of Bob’s signal. Or, to put it in
other words, we consider that Alice’s and Bob’s signals suffer from the same intensity fluctuations and
thus their intensities are equal. This means that such analysis is only valid to evaluate auto-compensating
TF-QKD set-ups like, for instance, the one introduced in [36]. It cannot be used however to analyze
set-ups where more than one laser source is used [34,35]. Although we do not expect a dramatic change
of our results when asymmetric intensity fluctuations are considered in the latter case, specially if they
are not too large.
Also, we assume that the signal and all the decoy intensities suffer from a fluctuation of magnitude 30%,
40% or 50% around their optimal value. This means for example that, for a fluctuation say of 30%, the
signal intensity α2 and all the decoy intensities µk fluctuate in the intervals: 0.7α
2
opt ≤ α2 ≤ 1.3α2opt and
0.7µoptk ≤ µk ≤ 1.3µoptk , respectively, where α2opt and µoptk represent the optimal values. We then account
for the worst-case scenario by numerically minimizing the key rate over all the intensities constrained in
their respective fluctuation interval. Only in this way we can still guarantee that the resulting key rate
is associated to a secure protocol.
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(a) Optimal values of the signal intensity α2 as a
function of the loss between Alice and Bob for
three different dark count rates. These values are
obtained from the optimization of the secret key
rate (solid lines) of figure 6.
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(b) Optimal values of the decoy intensity µ3 as a
function of the loss between Alice and Bob for
three different dark count rates. These values are
obtained from the optimization of the secret key
rate (solid lines) of figure 6. The other decoy
intensities are set to: µ0 = 10
−1, µ1 = 10−2 and
µ2 = 10
−3. The difference between this plot and
the optimal µ0 plots (see figure 3b and figure 5b) in
the case of two and three decoys is due to the fact
that, unlike µ0, the intensity µ3 does not appear in
all the yields’ bounds since we used the fourth decoy
just for bounding Y13, Y31, Y04 and Y40.
Fig. 7: Optimal values of the signal and decoy intensities α2 and µ3 for the TF-QKD protocol [33] when the parties
have at their disposal four decoy intensity settings to estimate the yields.
The results of this study are given in figure 8. Here we plot the original key rates –i.e. without fluctuations
of the signal and decoy intensities– as dashed lines+ and the key rates affected by intensity fluctuations
as solid lines. The plots are given for the same dark count rates and misalignments used in Sec. 3, in
the case of two, three and four decoy intensity settings. The color of the solid lines becomes brighter for
increasing fluctuation magnitude.
We observe that the performance of the protocol is considerably affected by intensity fluctuations in the
case of two decoys, while the effect becomes almost negligible for three and four decoys. The reason for
+ The dashed lines of the key rates without fluctuations correspond to the solid lines in figure 2, figure 4 and figure 6.
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Fig. 8: Comparison of the secret key rate with optimal signal and decoys intensities (dashed lines, computed in
Sec. 3) with the secret key rates affected by increasing intensity fluctuations (solid lines): 30%,40% and 50%
(brighter colors; right to left). We assume that the fluctuations affect each decoy intensity and the signal
intensity as well. The plots show that the TF-QKD protocol is quite robust against intensity fluctuations,
and that its robustness increases with the number of decoys.
this lies in the fact that the tightness of the yields’ bounds has a stronger dependence on the value of the
decoy intensities when the number of decoys –and thus constraints on the yields– is low. In other words,
if the parties have at their disposal a larger number of decoys, they can properly combine the numerous
constraints on the yields and obtain inherently tight bounds, i.e. bounds that are tight regardless of
the actual values of the intensities involved. If, instead, the parties have few decoys, say two, then the
bounds they derive on the yields can be tight or loose depending on the values assigned to the decoy
intensities, since the constraints on the yields are fewer.
In conclusion, in the case of two decoys the parties can tolerate intensity fluctuations up to 40%, which
correspond to a decrease in the protocol’s key rate especially in the high-loss region, quantified by a
reduction of about 5 to 6 dB of the maximum tolerated loss∗. Remarkably, with three decoys the
decrease of the maximum tolerated loss would be under 5 dB for fluctuations up to 50%. Finally, for four
decoys the protocol’s performance remains almost the same for fluctuations up to about 50% around
∗ By “maximum tolerated loss” we mean the loss threshold above which the protocol’s key rate becomes roughly zero.
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the optimal values (except when the dark count probability is the smallest considered: pd = 10
−8).
We deduce that the TF-QKD protocol introduced in [33] seems to be quite robust against intensity
fluctuations.
4. Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated in detail the performance of the Twin-Field quantum key distribution
(TF-QKD) protocol presented in [33] in the realistic scenario of a finite number of decoy intensity
settings at the parties’ disposal. Indeed, the protocol requires that Alice and Bob use the decoy-state
method [38–40] to estimate the phase-error rate by upper bounding certain yields. Unlike most QKD
protocols which employ such method, in this case the protocol’s key rate depends –in principle– on
infinitely many yields and it is essential to upper bound (rather than lower bound) their values. Clearly,
the more yields the parties tightly upper bound, the better the protocol’s performance is. We have
introduced an analytical method to perform such estimation when Alice and Bob use two, three or four
decoy intensity settings each. The yields’ analytical bounds provided in this work imply a fully-analytical
expression for the protocol’s secret key rate, which is very convenient for performance optimization (e.g.
in the finite-key scenario). Also, we remark that the secret key rates obtained with our analytical bounds
basically overlap those achievable with numerical tools like linear programming for most values of the
overall loss, which confirms that the analytical approach is actually quite tight.
In so doing, we have shown that the TF-QKD protocol can beat the PLOB bound [19] even with just
two decoys for reasonable values of the setup parameters, which include: the loss, the dark count rate,
the polarization misalignment and the phase mismatch. Furthermore the plots assuming four decoys
demonstrate that one can approximately achieve the best possible performance by tightly estimating
only nine yields. The optimization of the key rate over the signal and decoy intensities indicates that
their optimal values are all either constant or weakly-dependent on the loss of the channel. This means
that the protocol is particularly suitable for contexts where the channel loss varies in time, for instance
in the scalable MDI-QKD networks conceived in [43]. Finally we have investigated the scenario where
the intensities of the optical states prepared by Alice and Bob are affected by fluctuations and observed
that the protocol seems to be very robust against such phenomena.
A natural continuation of this work would take into account the finite-key effects due to the finite number
of pulses sent by the parties to the central relay. This could be done by combining the results presented
in this paper with the finite-keys estimation techniques used in [41].
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Appendix A. Channel model
The channel model that we employ to simulate the gains that would be observed experimentally in
the X-basis (i.e. the probabilities p(kc, kd|bA, bB)) and Z-basis (i.e. the probabilities Qk,lkc,kd) is taken
from [33]. In all the expressions of this Section we assume kc + kd = 1.
In particular, a beam splitter of transmittance
√
η accounts for the loss in the quantum channel linking
Alice (Bob) to node C and for the non-unity detection efficiency of detectors Dc and Dd. The polarization
misalignment introduced by the channel Alice-C (Bob-C) is modeled with a unitary operation mapping
the polarization input modes a†in (b
†
in) to the orthogonal polarization output modes a
†
out and a
†
out⊥ (b
†
out
and b†out⊥) according to: a
†
in → cos θAa†out − sin θAa†out⊥ (b†in → cos θBb†out − sin θBb†out⊥), for an angle
θA (θB). Moreover, the phase mismatch between Alice and Bob’s signals arriving at node C is modeled
by shifting the phase of Bob’s signals by an angle φ = δpi, for a certain parameter δ. Finally the model
considers that both detectors are affected by a dark count probability pd, which is independent of the
signals received and has the same value for both detectors.
With this setup, the gains in the X-basis can be written as:
p(kc, kd|bA, bB) = (1− pd)
[
pde
−2γ + q(kc, kd|bA, bB)
]
, (A.1)
where γ =
√
ηα2 (with α being the amplitude of the signal states) and
q(kc, kd|bA, bB) =
{
e−γ(1−cosφ cos θ) − e−2γ if kc ⊕ bA ⊕ bB = 1
e−γ(1+cosφ cos θ) − e−2γ if kc ⊕ bA ⊕ bB = 0 (A.2)
with θ = θA−θB . Starting from (A.1), one can readily compute the probability p(kc, kd) and the bit-error
rate ekc,kd by means of equations (1.4) and (1.5),(1.6), respectively:
p(kc, kd) =
1
2
(1− pd)
(
e−γ cosφ cos θ + eγ cosφ cos θ
)
e−γ − (1− pd)2e−2γ , (A.3)
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ekc,kd =
e−γ cosφ cos θ − (1− pd)e−γ
e−γ cosφ cos θ + eγ cosφ cos θ − 2(1− pd)e−γ . (A.4)
The gains in the Z-basis instead read:
Qk,lkc,kd = (1− pd)
[
(pd − 1)e−
√
η(µk+µl) + e−
√
η(µk+µl)/2I0(
√
ηµkµl cos θ)
]
, (A.5)
where the function I(z) = 12pii
∮
e(z/2)(t+1/t)t−1dt is the modified Bessel function of first kind.
In the simulations shown in Sec. 3 we compare the key rate computed with our analytical bounds on the
yields with the key rate evaluated with the exact expressions of the yields, i.e. the expressions obtained
directly from the channel model. According to the above channel model, the yields read:
Y kc,kdnm = (1− pd)
[
(pd − 1)(1−√η)n+m + ykc,kdnm
]
, (A.6)
where
ykc,kdnm =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
) m∑
l=0
(
m
l
)√
ηk+l(1−√η)n+m−k−l
2k+lk! l!
k∑
r=0
(
k
r
) l∑
p=0
(
l
p
) min(k,r+p)∑
q=max(0,r+p−l)
(
k
q
)
(
l
r + p− q
)
(r + p)! (k + l − r − p)! cosr+q(θA) cosr+2p−q(θB) sin2k−r−q(θA) sin2l−r−2p+q(θB) .
(A.7)
To conclude, we remark that all the quantities entering the key rate formula (1.2) –i.e. (A.3),(A.4) and
the gains (A.5) indirectly through the yields’ bounds– are symmetric under the swap kc ↔ kd due to the
symmetries of the channel model.
In all the simulations shown in Sec. 3 we fix both polarization and phase misalignments to 2%, which
means that: θA = −θB = arcsin
√
0.02 and δ = 0.02.
Appendix B. Stronger and weaker decoy intensities
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(a) Optimal key rate as a function of the overall loss
when the parties use three decoy intensity settings,
for three different values of the dark count rate (pd).
The solid lines are obtained by fixing the weaker
decoy intensities to µ2 = 10
−3 and µ1 = 10−2,
while the dot-dashed lines are obtained by fixing the
same intensities to µ2 = 10
−5 and µ1 = 10−4. The
dashed lines assume that all the yields are known
from the channel model and the magenta line is the
PLOB bound [19]. Note that the green dot-dashed
lines and green solid lines (pd = 10
−6) are almost
perfectly overlapping.
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(b) Optimal key rate as a function of the overall loss
when the parties use four decoy intensity settings,
for three different values of the dark count rate (pd).
The solid lines are obtained by fixing the weaker
decoy intensities to µ2 = 10
−3, µ1 = 10−2 and
µ0 = 10
−1, while the dot-dashed lines are obtained
by fixing the same intensities to µ2 = 10
−5, µ1 =
10−4 and µ0 = 10−3. The dashed lines assume that
all the yields are known from the channel model and
the magenta line is the PLOB bound [19].
Fig. B1: Comparison of the optimal key rates achievable with different fixed values of the weaker decoy intensities.
The two cases analyzed (solid and dot-dashed lines) are almost indistinguishable.
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As explained in Sec. 3, the optimal key rates are basically not affected if their optimization is only
performed over the signal intensity (α) and over one decoy intensity, while having the remaining weaker
decoy intensities fixed to near-to-optimal values for all losses. In figure B1, we compare the optimal
key rate that the parties can achieve when fixing their weaker decoy intensities to substantially different
values, in the case of three (left) and four (right) decoy intensity settings. In particular, the solid lines
are the same plotted in figure 4 and figure 6 for the three- and four-decoys case, respectively, i.e. they
are obtained by fixing the weaker decoy intensities to µ2 = 10
−3 and µ1 = 10−2 (three decoy intensity
settings) and to µ2 = 10
−3, µ1 = 10−2 and µ0 = 10−1 (four decoy intensity settings). The dot-dashed
lines, instead, are obtained by fixing the weaker intensities to values which are two orders of magnitude
lower, that is µ2 = 10
−5 and µ1 = 10−4 in the case of three decoy intensity settings and µ2 = 10−5,
µ1 = 10
−4 and µ0 = 10−3 in the case of four decoy intensity settings. Clearly, the optimal key rates
are basically not affected by employing relatively stronger pulses (those with µ2 = 10
−3 as the weakest
intensity) for the weaker decoy intensity settings. Such stronger pulses could be more easily implemented
experimentally and, for this, have been chosen in our simulations.
Appendix C. Yields’ bounds with three decoys
Here we derive analytical upper bounds on the yields appearing in (1.7), following the same lines of
Sec. 2. In this case we assume that Alice and Bob can prepare their phase-randomized coherent pulses
with three different intensity settings: {µ0, µ1, µ2}, which are the same for both parties. This choice is
optimal since we assumed that the two optical channels linking the parties to the central node C have
equal transmittance
√
η [43].
The whole set of infinite yields is subjected to the following nine equality constraints:
Q˜k,l ≡ eµk+µlQk,l =
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
µk
nµl
m k, l ∈ {0, 1, 2} , (C.1)
and to the inequality constraints given by (2.3).
We derive bounds on the yields Y00, Y11, Y02, Y20, Y22, Y13, Y31, Y04 and Y40.
Appendix C.1. Upper bound on Y22
Consider the following combinations of gains in which all the terms Y1m and Yn1 are removed (i.e. their
coefficients are equal to zero):
G0,122 = µ
2
1Q˜
0,0 + µ20Q˜
1,1 − µ0µ1(Q˜0,1 + Q˜1,0)
=
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
(µn0µ1 − µ0µn1 ) (µm0 µ1 − µ0µm1 ) ;
G0,222 = µ
2
2Q˜
0,0 + µ20Q˜
2,2 − µ0µ2(Q˜0,2 + Q˜2,0)
=
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
(µn0µ2 − µ0µn2 ) (µm0 µ2 − µ0µm2 ) ;
G1,222 = µ
2
2Q˜
1,1 + µ21Q˜
2,2 − µ1µ2(Q˜1,2 + Q˜2,1)
=
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
(µn1µ2 − µ1µn2 ) (µm1 µ2 − µ1µm2 ) , (C.2)
where the superscripts in Gk,l22 indicate which intensities are involved, while the subscripts indicate the
yield that is going to be bounded.
We now combine G0,122 , G
0,2
22 and G
1,2
22 with arbitrary real coefficients c0 and c1 and impose that the
resulting expression has the yields Y0m and Yn0 removed as well:
G0,122 + c0G
0,2
22 + c1G
1,2
22 =
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
[(µn0µ1 − µ0µn1 ) (µm0 µ1 − µ0µm1 )
+c0 (µ
n
0µ2 − µ0µn2 ) (µm0 µ2 − µ0µm2 ) + c1 (µn1µ2 − µ1µn2 ) (µm1 µ2 − µ1µm2 )] . (C.3)
Note that the linear combination above is already the most general for our needs. As a matter of fact,
for every linear combination of G0,122 , G
0,2
22 and G
1,2
22 one can always factor out the coefficient in front of
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G0,122 , as far as it is not zero. However, if the particular combination of gains which removes the terms
Y0m and Yn0 has a null coefficient in front of G
0,1
22 , for symmetry reasons there would also exist another
combination –that also removes the yields Y0m and Yn0– with a null coefficient in front of say G
0,2
22 , and
this one could be found in our case given by (C.3).
For Y0m and Yn0 to be removed in (C.3) it suffices that:
(µ1 − µ0)(µm0 µ1 − µ0µm1 ) + c0(µ2 − µ0)(µm0 µ2 − µ0µm2 ) + c1(µ2 − µ1)(µm1 µ2 − µ1µm2 ) = 0 ∀m, (C.4)
which implies:
µm0 [µ1(µ1 − µ0) + c0µ2(µ2 − µ0)] + µm1 [−µ0(µ1 − µ0) + c1µ2(µ2 − µ1)]
+ µm2 [−c0µ0(µ2 − µ0)− c1µ1(µ2 − µ1)] = 0 ∀m . (C.5)
A sufficient condition for this is that every coefficient of µmi is identically zero, which happens for:
c0 = −µ1(µ0 − µ1)
µ2(µ0 − µ2) , (C.6)
c1 =
µ0(µ0 − µ1)
µ2(µ1 − µ2) . (C.7)
Substituting (C.6) and (C.7) back into (C.3) and multiplying both sides by µ2, we get an expression where
all the terms Y0m, Y1m, Yn0 and Yn1 are removed and where the term Y22 gives the largest contribution:
µ2G
0,1
22 − µ1
(µ0 − µ1)
(µ0 − µ2) G
0,2
22 + µ0
(µ0 − µ1)
(µ1 − µ2) G
1,2
22 =
∞∑
n,m=2
Ynm
n!m!
[
µ2 (µ
n
0µ1 − µ0µn1 ) (µm0 µ1 − µ0µm1 )
− µ1 (µ0 − µ1)
(µ0 − µ2) (µ
n
0µ2 − µ0µn2 ) (µm0 µ2 − µ0µm2 ) + µ0
(µ0 − µ1)
(µ1 − µ2) (µ
n
1µ2 − µ1µn2 ) (µm1 µ2 − µ1µm2 )
]
. (C.8)
In order to extract a bound for Y22 we need to recast the yields’ coefficients in such a way that their sign
becomes manifest. Each term of the sum in (C.8) may be recast as follows:
Ynm
n!m!
µ0µ1µ2
[ (
µn−10 − µn−11
)
(µm0 µ1 − µ0µm1 ) −
(µ0 − µ1)
(µ0 − µ2)
(
µn−10 − µn−12
)
(µm0 µ2 − µ0µm2 )
+
(µ0 − µ1)
(µ1 − µ2)
(
µn−11 − µn−12
)
(µm1 µ2 − µ1µm2 )
]
, (C.9)
or equivalently as:
Ynm
n!m!
µ0µ1µ2
(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2) A22(µ0, µ1, µ2,m) ·A22(µ0, µ1, µ2, n) , (C.10)
where
A22(µ0, µ1, µ2,m) ≡ µm1 (µ0 − µ2) + µm2 (µ1 − µ0) + µm0 (µ2 − µ1) . (C.11)
We can now rewrite factor A22 as:
A22(µ0, µ1, µ2,m) = µ1
[
µm−11 (µ0 − µ2)− (µm0 − µm2 )
]
+ µ0µ2(µ
m−1
0 − µm−12 )
= µ1
[
µm−11 (µ0 − µ2)− (µ0 − µ2)
(
m−1∑
k=0
µm−1−k0 µ
k
2
)]
+ µ0µ2(µ0 − µ2)
m−2∑
j=0
µm−2−j0 µ
j
2

= (µ0 − µ2)
µm1 − µ1 m−1∑
k=0
µm−1−k0 µ
k
2 + µ0µ2
m−2∑
j=0
µm−2−j0 µ
j
2

= (µ0 − µ2)
[
µm1 +
m−1∑
k=0
µk2
(−µ1µm−1−k0 + µ0µ2µm−2−k0 )− µ0µ2µm−12µ0
]
= (µ0 − µ2)
[
−(µm2 − µm1 ) +
m−1∑
k=0
µk2µ
m−1−k
0 (µ2 − µ1)
]
= (µ0 − µ2)(µ2 − µ1)
m−1∑
k=0
µk2µ
m−1−k
0 −
m−1∑
j=0
µj2µ
m−1−j
1

= (µ0 − µ2)(µ2 − µ1)
m−1∑
k=0
µk2(µ
m−1−k
0 − µm−1−k1 ) . (C.12)
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Of course we can employ this expression also for A22(µ0, µ1, µ2, n), under the substitution m → n. We
will apply this consideration from now on to similar scenarios. By substituting (C.12) into (C.10), we
get the final expression for each term of the sum in (C.8):
Ynm
n!m!
µ0µ1µ2
(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2) (µ0 − µ2)
2(µ2 − µ1)2
×
[
m−1∑
k=0
µk2(µ
m−1−k
0 − µm−1−k1 )
]n−1∑
j=0
µj2(µ
n−1−j
0 − µn−1−j1 )
 . (C.13)
That is, the sign of Ynm’s coefficient is independent of n and m and it is the same for all terms in (C.8)
(note that the product of the two sums in (C.13) is always positive). Thus a valid upper bound for Y22
is obtained by setting all the other yields to zero in (C.8), except for Y22. We obtain:
µ2G
0,1
22 − µ1
(µ0 − µ1)
(µ0 − µ2) G
0,2
22 + µ0
(µ0 − µ1)
(µ1 − µ2) G
1,2
22 =
Y U22µ0µ1µ2
4
(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)(µ0 − µ1)2 , (C.14)
which implies the following expression for the upper bound on Y22:
Y U22 = 4
G0,122
µ0µ1(µ0−µ1) −
G0,222
µ0µ2(µ0−µ2) +
G1,222
µ1µ2(µ1−µ2)
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2) . (C.15)
We remark that the bound given by (C.15) is not valid when any of the intensities µ0, µ1 or µ2 is equal
to zero. As a matter of fact, in any of these cases the starting expression given by (C.8) becomes trivial.
However, in most practical situations, due to the finite extinction ratio of amplitude modulators, none
of the decoy intensities is actually equal to zero.
Appendix C.2. Upper bound on Y11
Consider the following combinations of gains in which all the terms Y0m and Yn0 are removed:
G0,111 = Q˜
0,0 + Q˜1,1 − (Q˜0,1 + Q˜1,0)
=
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
(µn0 − µn1 ) (µm0 − µm1 ) ;
G0,211 = Q˜
0,0 + Q˜2,2 − (Q˜0,2 + Q˜2,0)
=
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
(µn0 − µn2 ) (µm0 − µm2 ) ;
G1,211 = Q˜
1,1 + Q˜2,2 − (Q˜1,2 + Q˜2,1)
=
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
(µn1 − µn2 ) (µm1 − µm2 ) . (C.16)
We now combine G0,111 , G
0,2
11 and G
1,2
11 with arbitrary real coefficients c0 and c1 and impose that the
resulting expression has the yields Y2m and Yn2 also removed:
G0,111 + c0G
0,2
11 + c1G
1,2
11 =
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
[(µn0 − µn1 )(µm0 − µm1 ) + c0(µn0 − µn2 )(µm0 − µm2 ) + c1(µn1 − µn2 )(µm1 − µm2 )] . (C.17)
For Y2m and Yn2 to be removed it suffices:
(µn0 − µn1 )(µ20 − µ21) + c0(µn0 − µn2 )(µ20 − µ22) + c1(µn1 − µn2 )(µ21 − µ22) = 0 ∀n , (C.18)
which is fulfilled by:
c0 = − (µ
2
0 − µ21)
(µ20 − µ22)
, (C.19)
c1 =
(µ20 − µ21)
(µ21 − µ22)
. (C.20)
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Substituting these terms back into (C.17) yields a combination of gains in which the terms Y0m, Yn0, Y2m
and Yn2 are removed:
G0,111 −
(µ20 − µ21)
(µ20 − µ22)
G0,211 +
(µ20 − µ21)
(µ21 − µ22)
G1,211 =
Y11(µ0 − µ1)
[
(µ0 − µ1)− (µ0 + µ1)
(µ0 + µ2)
(µ0 − µ2) + (µ0 + µ1)
(µ1 + µ2)
(µ1 − µ2)
]
+
∞∑
m=3
Y1m
m!
(µ0 − µ1)
[
(µm0 − µm1 )−
(µ0 + µ1)
(µ0 + µ2)
(µm0 − µm2 ) +
(µ0 + µ1)
(µ1 + µ2)
(µm1 − µm2 )
]
+
∞∑
n=3
Yn1
n!
(µ0 − µ1)
[
(µn0 − µn1 )−
(µ0 + µ1)
(µ0 + µ2)
(µn0 − µn2 ) +
(µ0 + µ1)
(µ1 + µ2)
(µn1 − µn2 )
]
+
∞∑
n,m=3
Ynm
n!m!
[
(µn0 − µn1 )(µm0 − µm1 )−
(µ20 − µ21)
(µ20 − µ22)
(µn0 − µn2 )(µm0 − µm2 ) +
(µ20 − µ21)
(µ21 − µ22)
(µn1 − µn2 )(µm1 − µm2 )
]
.
(C.21)
In order to get a valid upper bound for Y11 we need to determine the signs of the coefficients of the
remaining yields. We start by recasting each term of the sum in (C.21) corresponding to the Ynm, with
n,m ≥ 3, as follows:
Ynm
n!m!
1
(µ20 − µ22)(µ21 − µ22)
A11(µ0, µ1, µ2,m) ·A11(µ0, µ1, µ2, n) , (C.22)
where
A11(µ0, µ1, µ2,m) ≡ µm1 (µ20 − µ22) + µm2 (µ21 − µ20) + µm0 (µ22 − µ21) . (C.23)
The factor A11 can be rewritten as:
A11(µ0, µ1, µ2,m) = µ
2
1
[
µm−21 (µ
2
0 − µ22)− (µm0 − µm2 )
]
+ µ20µ
2
2(µ
m−2
0 − µm−22 )
= (µ0 − µ2)
µm1 (µ0 + µ2)− µ21 m−1∑
k=0
µm−1−k0 µ
k
2 + µ
2
0µ
2
2
m−3∑
j=0
µm−3−j0 µ
j
2

= (µ0 − µ2)
[
µm1 (µ0 + µ2) +
m−1∑
k=0
µk2
(−µ21µm−1−k0 + µ20µ22µm−3−k0 )− µ20µ22(µm−22µ0 + µ
m−1
2
µ20
)]
= (µ0 − µ2)
[
(µm1 − µm2 )(µ0 + µ2) +
m−1∑
k=0
µk2µ
m−1−k
0
(
µ22 − µ21
)]
= (µ0 − µ2)
(µ0 + µ2)(µ1 − µ2)
m−1∑
j=0
µm−1−j1 µ
j
2
− (µ1 + µ2)(µ1 − µ2)m−1∑
k=0
µk2µ
m−1−k
0

= (µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)
m−1∑
k=0
µk2
[
(µ0 + µ2)µ
m−1−k
1 − (µ1 + µ2)µm−1−k0
]
= (µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)
{m−3∑
k=0
µk2
[
µ2(µ
m−1−k
1 − µm−1−k0 ) + µ0µ1(µm−2−k1 − µm−2−k0 )
]
+ µm−12 (µ0 − µ1) + µm−12 (µ1 − µ0)
}
= (µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ0)
m−3∑
k=0
µk2
µ2 m−2−k∑
j=0
µm−2−k−j1 µ
j
0 + µ0µ1
m−3−k∑
j=0
µm−3−k−j1 µ
j
0

= (µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ0)
m−3∑
k=0
µk2
(µ2 + µ0)m−3−k∑
j=0
µm−2−k−j1 µ
j
0 + µ2µ
m−2−k
0

≡ (µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ0)F (m) , (C.24)
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where the factor F (m) ≥ 0 , ∀m ≥ 3. Substituting (C.24) back into (C.22), we recast each term of the
sum in (C.21) corresponding to the Ynm, with n,m ≥ 3, as:
Ynm
n!m!
(µ0 − µ2)2(µ1 − µ2)2(µ1 − µ0)2
(µ20 − µ22)(µ21 − µ22)
F (n)F (m) , (C.25)
so that its sign is manifestly dependent on the factor (µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2).
In a similar fashion, one can rewrite each term of the sum in (C.21) corresponding to the Y1m, with
m ≥ 3, as:
−Y1m
m!
(µ0 − µ1)2(µ1 − µ2)(µ0 − µ2)
(µ0 + µ2)(µ1 + µ2)
F (m) , (C.26)
thus deducing that this expression has opposite sign with respect to that given by (C.25). Same holds
for Yn1, since it can be shown that its coefficient is exactly (C.26) with the substitution m→ n.
Finally, by showing that the term corresponding to Y11 in (C.21) can be factorized as:
Y11
(µ0 − µ1)2(µ1 − µ2)(µ0 − µ2)
(µ0 + µ2)(µ1 + µ2)
, (C.27)
one concludes that this expression has the same sign as that given by (C.25).
Putting together these considerations into (C.21), a valid upper bound on Y11 is obtained when the yields
Ynm, with n,m ≥ 3, are set to zero and the yields Y1m and Yn1 are set to their maximum allowed value.
Since in Appendix C.5 and Appendix C.6 we derive upper bounds on Y13 and Y31 (see C.65 and C.73),
we can employ them in (C.21) instead of trivially bounding these yields with 1. In this way we obtain:
G0,111 −
(µ20 − µ21)
(µ20 − µ22)
G0,211 +
(µ20 − µ21)
(µ21 − µ22)
G1,211 = Y
U
11
(µ0 − µ1)2(µ1 − µ2)(µ0 − µ2)
(µ0 + µ2)(µ1 + µ2)
+
(µ0 − µ1)
6
(Y U13 + Y
U
31)
[
µ30 − µ31 −
(µ0 + µ1)
(µ0 + µ2)
(µ30 − µ32) +
(µ0 + µ1)
(µ1 + µ2)
(µ31 − µ32)
]
+ 2(µ0 − µ1)
∞∑
n=4
[
(µn0 − µn1 )
n!
− (µ0 + µ1)
(µ0 + µ2)
(µn0 − µn2 )
n!
+
(µ0 + µ1)
(µ1 + µ2)
(µn1 − µn2 )
n!
]
, (C.28)
which leads to the following upper bound on Y11:
Y U11 =
(µ0 + µ2)(µ1 + µ2)
(µ0 − µ1)2(µ1 − µ2)(µ0 − µ2)
[
G0,111 −
(µ20 − µ21)
(µ20 − µ22)
G0,211 +
(µ20 − µ21)
(µ21 − µ22)
G1,211 − 2(µ0 − µ1)E11
]
+
(µ1µ2 + µ0µ1 + µ0µ2)
6
(Y U13 + Y
U
31) , (C.29)
where the term E11 is defined as:
E11 = e
µ0 − eµ1 − (µ0 − µ1)
(
1 +
µ0
2
+
µ1
2
+
µ20
6
+
µ21
6
+
µ0µ1
6
)
+
µ0 + µ1
µ1 + µ2
[
eµ1 − eµ2 − (µ1 − µ2)
(
1 +
µ1
2
+
µ2
2
+
µ21
6
+
µ22
6
+
µ1µ2
6
)]
− µ0 + µ1
µ0 + µ2
[
eµ0 − eµ2 − (µ0 − µ2)
(
1 +
µ0
2
+
µ2
2
+
µ20
6
+
µ22
6
+
µ0µ2
6
)]
. (C.30)
Appendix C.3. Upper bound on Y02 and Y04
Consider the following combinations of gains in which all the terms Y1m and , Yn0 are removed:
G0,102 = µ1Q˜
0,0 + µ0Q˜
1,1 − µ1Q˜0,1 − µ0Q˜1,0
=
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
(µn0µ1 − µ0µn1 ) (µm0 − µm1 ) ;
G0,202 = µ2Q˜
0,0 + µ0Q˜
2,2 − µ2Q˜0,2 − µ0Q˜2,0
=
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
(µn0µ2 − µ0µn2 ) (µm0 − µm2 ) ;
G1,202 = µ2Q˜
1,1 + µ1Q˜
2,2 − µ2Q˜1,2 − µ1Q˜2,1
=
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
(µn1µ2 − µ1µn2 ) (µm1 − µm2 ) . (C.31)
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We now combine G0,102 , G
0,2
02 and G
1,2
02 with arbitrary real coefficients c0 and c1 and impose that the
resulting expression has the yields Y2m and Yn1 also removed:
G0,102 + c0G
0,2
02 + c1G
1,2
02 =
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
[(µn0µ1 − µ0µn1 )(µm0 − µm1 ) + c0(µn0µ2 − µ0µn2 )(µm0 − µm2 ) + c1(µn1µ2 − µ1µn2 )(µm1 − µm2 )] .
(C.32)
For Y2m and Yn1 to be removed the coefficients c0 and c1 must satisfy:{
(µn0µ1 − µ0µn1 )(µ0 − µ1) + c0(µn0µ2 − µ0µn2 )(µ0 − µ2) + c1(µn1µ2 − µ1µn2 )(µ1 − µ2) = 0 ∀n
(µ20µ1 − µ0µ21)(µm0 − µm1 ) + c0(µ20µ2 − µ0µ22)(µm0 − µm2 ) + c1(µ21µ2 − µ1µ22)(µm1 − µm2 ) = 0 ∀m
(C.33)
or equivalently:
µn0 [µ1(µ0 − µ1) + c0µ2(µ0 − µ2)] + µn1 [−µ0(µ0 − µ1) + c1µ2(µ1 − µ2)]
−µn2 [µ0c0(µ0 − µ2) + µ1c1(µ1 − µ2)] = 0 ∀n
µm0
[
µ1µ
2
0 − µ0µ21 + c0(µ2µ20 − µ0µ22)
]
+ µm1
[−(µ1µ20 − µ0µ21) + c1(µ2µ21 − µ1µ22)]
−µm2
[
c0(µ2µ
2
0 − µ0µ22) + c1(µ2µ21 − µ1µ22)
]
= 0 ∀m.
(C.34)
A sufficient condition for this is that the coefficient of every µni and every µ
m
i is identically zero. This
imposes six conditions on c0 and c1, however thanks to the inherent symmetries of the system a solution
exists, and reads:
c0 = −µ1(µ0 − µ1)
µ2(µ0 − µ2) , (C.35)
c1 =
µ0(µ0 − µ1)
µ2(µ1 − µ2) . (C.36)
Substituting these expressions back into (C.32) and multiplying both sides by µ2, yields a combination
of gains in which the terms Yn0, Yn1, Y1m and Y2m are removed. In particular, we obtain:
µ2G
0,1
02 −
µ1(µ0 − µ1)
(µ0 − µ2) G
0,2
02 +
µ0(µ0 − µ1)
(µ1 − µ2) G
1,2
02 =
∞∑
m=2
Y0m
m!
(µ0 − µ1) [−µ2(µm0 − µm1 ) + µ1(µm0 − µm2 )− µ0(µm1 − µm2 )]
+
∞∑
n=3
m=2
Ynm
n!m!
[
µ2(µ
n
0µ1 − µ0µn1 )(µm0 − µm1 )−
µ1(µ0 − µ1)
(µ0 − µ2) (µ
n
0µ2 − µ0µn2 )(µm0 − µm2 )
+
µ0(µ0 − µ1)
(µ1 − µ2) (µ
n
1µ2 − µ1µn2 )(µm1 − µm2 )
]
. (C.37)
In order to get a valid upper bound for Y02 and Y04 we need to study the sign of the coefficients of the
remaining yields. We start by recasting each term of the sum corresponding to the Ynm, with n ≥ 3 and
m ≥ 2, in (C.37) as follows:
Ynm
n!m!
1
(µ0 − µ2)(µ2 − µ1)A22(µ0, µ1, µ2,m) ·B02(µ0, µ1, µ2, n) , (C.38)
where
B02(µ0, µ1, µ2, n) ≡ µ1µ2µn0 (µ1 − µ2) + µ20(µ1µn2 − µ2µn1 ) + µ0(µ22µn1 − µ21µn2 ) (C.39)
and A22 is the one found when bounding Y22, thus we know from (C.12) it can be recast as:
A22(µ0, µ1, µ2,m) = (µ0 − µ2)(µ2 − µ1)
m−1∑
k=0
µk2(µ
m−1−k
0 − µm−1−k1 ) . (C.40)
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We can rewrite B02 as:
B02(µ0, µ1, µ2, n) = µ0µ1µ2(µ1 − µ2)
µn−10 − µ0 n−2∑
k=0
µn−2−k1 µ
k
2 + µ1µ2
n−3∑
j=0
µn−3−j1 µ
j
2

= µ0µ1µ2(µ1 − µ2)
[
µn−10 +
n−2∑
k=0
µn−2−k1 µ
k
2(µ2 − µ0)− µn−12
]
= µ0µ1µ2(µ1 − µ2)
[
µn−10 − µn−12 −
n−2∑
k=0
µn−2−k1 µ
k
2(µ0 − µ2)
]
= µ0µ1µ2(µ1 − µ2)(µ0 − µ2)
[
n−2∑
k=0
µk2µ
n−2−k
0 −
n−2∑
k=0
µk2µ
n−2−k
1
]
= µ0µ1µ2(µ1 − µ2)(µ0 − µ2)
n−2∑
k=0
µk2(µ
n−2−k
0 − µn−2−k1 ) . (C.41)
Employing (C.40) and (C.41) into (C.38) we get:
Ynm
n!m!
µ0µ1µ2(µ1 − µ2)(µ0 − µ2)
[
n−2∑
k=0
µk2(µ
n−2−k
0 − µn−2−k1 )
][
m−1∑
k=0
µk2(µ
m−1−k
0 − µm−1−k1 )
]
, (C.42)
which means that the sign of this expression is fully determined by the factor (µ1 − µ2)(µ0 − µ2) (note
that the product of the two sums in (C.42) is always positive).
Concerning the terms that appear in the sum in (C.37) corresponding to the Y0m, with m ≥ 2, we have:
Y0m
m!
(µ1 − µ0) [µ2(µm0 − µm1 )− µ1(µm0 − µm2 ) + µ0(µm1 − µm2 )]
=
Y0m
m!
(µ1 − µ0)A22(µ0, µ1, µ2,m)
=
Y0m
m!
(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)(µ0 − µ1)
m−1∑
k=0
µk2(µ
m−1−k
0 − µm−1−k1 ) , (C.43)
where we used (C.11) in the first equality and (C.40) in the second equality. Expression (C.43) implies
that its sign is always equal to the sign of the terms given by (C.42), since it is determined by the same
factor (µ1 − µ2)(µ0 − µ2) (note that the product of the last two factors in (C.43) is always positive).
A valid upper bound on Y02 is thus obtained by setting all the other yields to zero in (C.37). By doing
so, we obtain:
Y U02 = 2
µ2G
0,1
02
µ0−µ1 −
µ1G
0,2
02
µ0−µ2 +
µ0G
1,2
02
µ1−µ2
(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)(µ0 − µ1) . (C.44)
One can do the same when bounding Y04, i.e. setting all the other yields to zero except for Y04, in (C.37).
We find that:
Y U04 = 4!
µ2G
0,1
02
µ0−µ1 −
µ1G
0,2
02
µ0−µ2 +
µ0G
1,2
02
µ1−µ2
µ1(µ40 − µ42)− µ0(µ41 − µ42)− µ2(µ40 − µ41)
. (C.45)
Appendix C.4. Upper bound on Y20 and Y40
Consider the following combinations of gains in which all the terms Y0m and Yn1 are removed:
G0,120 = µ1Q˜
0,0 + µ0Q˜
1,1 − µ0Q˜0,1 − µ1Q˜1,0
=
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
(µn0 − µn1 )(µm0 µ1 − µ0µm1 ) ;
G0,220 = µ2Q˜
0,0 + µ0Q˜
2,2 − µ0Q˜0,2 − µ2Q˜2,0
=
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
(µn0 − µn2 )(µm0 µ2 − µ0µm2 ) ;
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G1,220 = µ2Q˜
1,1 + µ1Q˜
2,2 − µ1Q˜1,2 − µ2Q˜2,1
=
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
(µn1 − µn2 )(µm1 µ2 − µ1µm2 ) . (C.46)
We now combine G0,120 , G
0,2
20 and G
1,2
20 with arbitrary real coefficients c0 and c1 and impose that the
resulting expression has the yields Y1m and Yn2 also removed:
G0,120 + c0G
0,2
20 + c1G
1,2
20 =
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
[(µn0 − µn1 )(µm0 µ1 − µ0µm1 ) + c0(µn0 − µn2 )(µm0 µ2 − µ0µm2 ) + c1(µn1 − µn2 )(µm1 µ2 − µ1µm2 )] .
(C.47)
For Y1m and Yn2 to be removed the coefficients c0 and c1 must satisfy:{
(µm0 µ1 − µ0µm1 )(µ0 − µ1) + c0(µm0 µ2 − µ0µm2 )(µ0 − µ2) + c1(µm1 µ2 − µ1µm2 )(µ1 − µ2) = 0 ∀m
(µ20µ1 − µ0µ21)(µn0 − µn1 ) + c0(µ20µ2 − µ0µ22)(µn0 − µn2 ) + c1(µ21µ2 − µ1µ22)(µn1 − µn2 ) = 0 ∀n .
(C.48)
This system of linear equations coincides with the one given by (C.33) that we found when bounding Y02,
thus the solution is given by (C.35) for c0 and by (C.36) for c1. Substituting these expressions back into
(C.47) and multiplying both sides by µ2, yields a combination of gains in which the terms Yn1, Yn2, Y0m
and Y1m are removed:
µ2G
0,1
20 −
µ1(µ0 − µ1)
(µ0 − µ2) G
0,2
20 +
µ0(µ0 − µ1)
(µ1 − µ2) G
1,2
20 =
∞∑
n=2
Yn0
n!
(µ0 − µ1) [−µ2(µn0 − µn1 ) + µ1(µn0 − µn2 )− µ0(µn1 − µn2 )]
+
∞∑
n=2
m=3
Ynm
n!m!
[
µ2(µ
n
0 − µn1 )(µm0 µ1 − µ0µm1 )−
µ1(µ0 − µ1)
(µ0 − µ2) (µ
n
0 − µn2 )(µm0 µ2 − µ0µm2 )
+
µ0(µ0 − µ1)
(µ1 − µ2) (µ
n
1 − µn2 )(µm1 µ2 − µ1µm2 )
]
. (C.49)
Since the coefficients of Yn0 and Ynm coincide with those found when bounding Y02 if one exchanges
m←→ n, we can directly use the results obtained in Appendix C.3 to recast the terms that contain the
Ynm with n ≥ 2 and m ≥ 3. In particular, according to (C.42), we obtain:
Ynm
n!m!
µ0µ1µ2(µ1 − µ2)(µ0 − µ2)
[
m−2∑
k=0
µk2(µ
m−2−k
0 − µm−2−k1 )
][
n−1∑
k=0
µk2(µ
n−1−k
0 − µn−1−k1 )
]
, (C.50)
and according to (C.43) the terms that contain the yields Yn0 can be written as:
Yn0
n!
(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)(µ0 − µ1)
n−1∑
k=0
µk2(µ
n−1−k
0 − µn−1−k1 ) . (C.51)
Like in the case of Y02 (see Appendix C.3), a valid upper bound on Y20 is thus obtained setting all the
other yields to zero in (C.49). We obtain:
Y U20 = 2
µ2G
0,1
20
µ0−µ1 −
µ1G
0,2
20
µ0−µ2 +
µ0G
1,2
20
µ1−µ2
(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)(µ0 − µ1) . (C.52)
One can do the same to bound Y40, i.e. to set all the other yields to zero, except for Y40. In this case we
obtain:
Y U04 = 4!
µ2G
0,1
20
µ0−µ1 −
µ1G
0,2
20
µ0−µ2 +
µ0G
1,2
20
µ1−µ2
µ1(µ40 − µ42)− µ0(µ41 − µ42)− µ2(µ40 − µ41)
. (C.53)
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Appendix C.5. Upper bound on Y13
We look for that combination of gains in which all the terms proportional to Yn0, Yn1, Y0m and Y2m are
removed. In order to find it, we consider the most general combination of all gains:
G13 =
2∑
i,j=0
ci,jQ˜
i,j =
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
 2∑
i,j=0
ci,jµ
n
i µ
m
j
 , (C.54)
and impose proper conditions on the real coefficients ci,j :
Yn0 removed:
2∑
i=0
µni
 2∑
j=0
ci,j
 = 0 ∀n ⇐ ci,0 + ci,1 + ci,2 = 0 for i = 0, 1, 2 (C.55)
Yn1 removed:
2∑
i=0
µni
 2∑
j=0
µjci,j
 = 0 ∀n ⇐ µ0ci,0 + µ1ci,1 + µ2ci,2 = 0 for i = 0, 1, 2 (C.56)
Y0m removed:
2∑
j=0
µmj
(
2∑
i=0
ci,j
)
= 0 ∀m ⇐ c0,j + c1,j + c2,j = 0 for j = 0, 1, 2 (C.57)
Y2m removed:
2∑
j=0
µmj
(
2∑
i=0
µ2i ci,j
)
= 0 ∀m ⇐ µ20c0,j + µ21c1,j + µ22c2,j = 0 for j = 0, 1, 2 . (C.58)
The conditions given by equations (C.55, C.56, C.57, C.58) form an overdetermined system of equations
for the nine variables ci,j . However, thanks to the symmetries of the problem, a unique solution for ci,j
exists and reads (we rescale every coefficient by requiring c0,0 = 1):
c0,0 = 1 ,
c0,1 = − (µ0 − µ2)
µ1 − µ2 ,
c0,2 = −1− c0,1 = µ0 − µ1
µ1 − µ2 ,
c1,0 = − (µ
2
0 − µ22)
µ21 − µ22
,
c1,1 = c1,0c0,1 =
(µ20 − µ22)(µ0 − µ2)
(µ21 − µ22)(µ1 − µ2)
,
c1,2 = −c1,0 − c1,1 = c1,0c0,2 = − (µ
2
0 − µ22)(µ0 − µ1)
(µ21 − µ22)(µ1 − µ2)
,
c2,0 = −1− c1,0 = µ
2
0 − µ21
µ21 − µ22
,
c2,1 = −c0,1 − c1,1 = c0,1c2,0 = (µ
2
1 − µ20)(µ0 − µ2)
(µ21 − µ22)(µ1 − µ2)
,
c2,2 = −c2,0 − c2,1 = (1 + c1,0)(1 + c0,1) = (µ
2
0 − µ21)(µ0 − µ1)
(µ21 − µ22)(µ1 − µ2)
. (C.59)
By substituting (C.59) back into (C.54) we get an expression in which the terms Yn0, Yn1, Y0m and Y2m
are removed:
G13 =
∞∑
m=2
Y1m
m!
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)
(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 + µ2) ·A22(µ0, µ1, µ2,m)
+
∞∑
n=3
m=2
Ynm
n!m!
A22(µ0, µ1, µ2,m) ·A11(µ0, µ1, µ2, n)
(µ1 − µ2)2(µ1 + µ2) , (C.60)
where A22 is the factor given by (C.11) also present in the bounds for Y02 and Y22, whereas A11 is the
factor given by (C.23) which appears in the bound on Y11. Note that this is somehow expected: when
bounding Y02 and Y22 we removed the terms Yn0 and Yn1 as we just did for Y13, and in bounding Y11 we
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removed the terms Y0m and Y2m as we did here. Therefore, by exploiting the result given by (C.12) we
can recast each term of the sum corresponding to the Y1m, with m ≥ 2, in (C.60) as:
−Y1m
m!
(µ0 − µ2)2
(µ1 + µ2)
(µ0 − µ1)
m−1∑
k=0
µk2(µ
m−1−k
0 − µm−1−k1 ) , (C.61)
and realize that it is always negative, regardless of the value of the intensities.
By employing the results (C.12, C.24) we can recast each term of the sum corresponding to the Ynm
with n ≥ 3 and m ≥ 2, in (C.60) as:
Ynm
n!m!
(µ0 − µ2)2(µ1 − µ2)2
(µ1 − µ2)2(µ1 + µ2) (µ0 − µ1)
m−1∑
k=0
µk2(µ
m−1−k
0 − µm−1−k1 )F (n) , (C.62)
and realize that it is always positive], regardless of the intensities.
A valid upper bound on Y13 is then obtained by setting Y1m → 0 (except for Y13) and Ynm → 1 for all
n ≥ 3 and m ≥ 2 in (C.60). As a result we obtain:
G13 = − Y
U
13
3!
(µ0 − µ2)2
(µ1 + µ2)
(µ0 − µ1)
[
µ20 − µ21 + µ2(µ0 − µ1)
]
+
∞∑
n=3
m=2
[µm1 (µ0 − µ2) + µm2 (µ1 − µ0) + µm0 (µ2 − µ1)] ·
[
µn1 (µ
2
0 − µ22) + µn2 (µ21 − µ20) + µn0 (µ22 − µ21)
]
n!m! (µ1 − µ2)2(µ1 + µ2) ,
(C.63)
which implies:
Y U13
6
(µ0 − µ2)2(µ0 − µ1)2(µ0 + µ1 + µ2)
µ1 + µ2
= −G13
+
(eµ1 − µ1 − 1)(µ0 − µ2) + (eµ2 − µ2 − 1)(µ1 − µ0) + (eµ0 − µ0 − 1)(µ2 − µ1)
(µ1 − µ2)2(µ1 + µ2)
×
[
(eµ1 − µ
2
1
2
− µ1 − 1)(µ20 − µ22) + (eµ2 −
µ22
2
− µ2 − 1)(µ21 − µ20) + (eµ0 −
µ20
2
− µ0 − 1)(µ22 − µ21)
]
.
(C.64)
We thus obtain the following upper bound on Y13:
Y U13 = −
6(µ1 + µ2)G13
(µ0 − µ2)2(µ0 − µ1)2(µ0 + µ1 + µ2) +
6
(µ0 − µ2)2(µ1 − µ2)2(µ0 − µ1)2(µ0 + µ1 + µ2)
× [eµ2(µ1 − µ0) + eµ1(µ0 − µ2) + eµ0(µ2 − µ1)]
× [eµ2(µ21 − µ20) + eµ1(µ20 − µ22) + eµ0(µ22 − µ21)− (µ0 − µ1)(µ1 − µ2)(µ0 − µ2)] , (C.65)
where G13 is defined in (C.54) and the coefficients of the combination of gains in (C.59).
Appendix C.6. Upper bound on Y31
We look for that combination of gains in which all the terms proportional to Yn0, Yn2, Y0m and Y1m are
removed. In order to find it, we proceed like in the previous case. That is, we consider the most general
combination of all gains:
G31 =
2∑
i,j=0
ci,jQ˜
i,j =
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
 2∑
i,j=0
ci,jµ
n
i µ
m
j
 , (C.66)
and impose proper conditions on the real coefficients ci,j :
Yn0 removed:
2∑
i=0
µni
 2∑
j=0
ci,j
 = 0 ∀n ⇐ ci,0 + ci,1 + ci,2 = 0 for i = 0, 1, 2 (C.67)
Yn2 removed:
2∑
i=0
µni
 2∑
j=0
µ2jci,j
 = 0 ∀n ⇐ µ20ci,0 + µ21ci,1 + µ22ci,2 = 0 for i = 0, 1, 2 (C.68)
] F (n) is defined in (C.24).
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Y0m removed:
2∑
j=0
µmj
(
2∑
i=0
ci,j
)
= 0 ∀m ⇐ c0,j + c1,j + c2,j = 0 for j = 0, 1, 2 (C.69)
Y1m removed:
2∑
j=0
µmj
(
2∑
i=0
µici,j
)
= 0 ∀m ⇐ µ0c0,j + µ1c1,j + µ2c2,j = 0 for j = 0, 1, 2 . (C.70)
The conditions (C.67, C.68, C.69, C.70) form an overdetermined system of equations for the nine variables
ci,j . However, thanks to the symmetries of the problem, a unique solution for ci,j exists and reads (we
rescale every coefficient by requiring c0,0 = 1):
c0,0 = 1 ,
c0,1 = − (µ
2
0 − µ22)
µ21 − µ22
,
c0,2 = −1− c0,1 = µ
2
0 − µ21
µ21 − µ22
,
c1,0 = − (µ0 − µ2)
µ1 − µ2 ,
c1,1 = c1,0c0,1 =
(µ20 − µ22)(µ0 − µ2)
(µ21 − µ22)(µ1 − µ2)
,
c1,2 = −c1,0 − c1,1 = c1,0c0,2 = (µ
2
1 − µ20)(µ0 − µ2)
(µ21 − µ22)(µ1 − µ2)
,
c2,0 = −1− c1,0 = µ0 − µ1
µ1 − µ2 ,
c2,1 = −c0,1 − c1,1 = c0,1c2,0 = − (µ
2
0 − µ22)(µ0 − µ1)
(µ21 − µ22)(µ1 − µ2)
,
c2,2 = −c2,0 − c2,1 = (1 + c1,0)(1 + c0,1) = (µ
2
0 − µ21)(µ0 − µ1)
(µ21 − µ22)(µ1 − µ2)
. (C.71)
By substituting (C.71) back into (C.66) we get an expression in which the terms Yn0, Yn2, Y0m and Y1m
are removed:
G31 =
∞∑
n=2
Yn1
n!
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)
(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 + µ2) ·A22(µ0, µ1, µ2, n) +
∞∑
n=2
m=3
Ynm
n!m!
A22(µ0, µ1, µ2, n) ·A11(µ0, µ1, µ2,m)
(µ1 − µ2)2(µ1 + µ2) , (C.72)
where A22 and A11 are again the factors from Y22 and Y11 bounds given by equations (C.11,C.23),
similarly to what happens when bounding Y13 (see Appendix C.5). Therefore the analysis of the
coefficients’ sign is the same as in Appendix C.5. Hence a valid upper bound on Y31 is obtained by
setting Yn1 → 0 (except for Y31) and Ynm → 1 in (C.72) for all n ≥ 2 and m ≥ 3 in (C.72). Analogous
steps to those in Appendix C.5 lead to the following upper bound:
Y U31 = −
6(µ1 + µ2)G31
(µ0 − µ2)2(µ0 − µ1)2(µ0 + µ1 + µ2) +
6
(µ0 − µ2)2(µ1 − µ2)2(µ0 − µ1)2(µ0 + µ1 + µ2)
× [eµ2(µ1 − µ0) + eµ1(µ0 − µ2) + eµ0(µ2 − µ1)]
× [eµ2(µ21 − µ20) + eµ1(µ20 − µ22) + eµ0(µ22 − µ21)− (µ0 − µ1)(µ1 − µ2)(µ0 − µ2)] , (C.73)
where G31 is defined in (C.66) and the coefficients of the combination of gains in (C.71).
Appendix C.7. Upper bound on Y00
Consider the following combinations of gains in which all the terms Y1m and Yn1 are removed:
G0,100 = µ
2
1Q˜
0,0 + µ20Q˜
1,1 − µ0µ1(Q˜0,1 + Q˜1,0)
=
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
(µn0µ1 − µ0µn1 ) (µm0 µ1 − µ0µm1 ) ;
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G0,200 = µ
2
2Q˜
0,0 + µ20Q˜
2,2 − µ0µ2(Q˜0,2 + Q˜2,0)
=
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
(µn0µ2 − µ0µn2 ) (µm0 µ2 − µ0µm2 ) ;
G1,200 = µ
2
2Q˜
1,1 + µ21Q˜
2,2 − µ1µ2(Q˜1,2 + Q˜2,1)
=
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
(µn1µ2 − µ1µn2 ) (µm1 µ2 − µ1µm2 ) . (C.74)
We now combine G0,100 , G
0,2
00 and G
1,2
00 with arbitrary real coefficients c0 and c1 and impose that the terms
Y2m and Yn2 are also removed in the resulting expression:
G0,100 + c0G
0,2
00 + c1G
1,2
00 =
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
[(µn0µ1 − µ0µn1 ) (µm0 µ1 − µ0µm1 )
+c0 (µ
n
0µ2 − µ0µn2 ) (µm0 µ2 − µ0µm2 ) + c1 (µn1µ2 − µ1µn2 ) (µm1 µ2 − µ1µm2 )] . (C.75)
For Y2m and Yn2 to be removed it suffices that for every m it holds:
(µ20µ1 − µ0µ21)(µm0 µ1 − µ0µm1 ) + c0(µ20µ2 − µ0µ22)(µm0 µ2 − µ0µm2 ) + c1(µ21µ2 − µ1µ22)(µm1 µ2 − µ1µm2 ) = 0 ,
(C.76)
which is fulfilled by:
c0 = −µ
2
1(µ0 − µ1)
µ22(µ0 − µ2)
, (C.77)
c1 =
µ20(µ0 − µ1)
µ22(µ1 − µ2)
. (C.78)
Substituting (C.77) and (C.78) back into (C.75) and multiplying both sides by µ22, we get an expression
where all the terms Y0m, Y2m, Yn0 and Yn2 are removed and where the term Y00 gives the largest
contribution. More precisely, we find that:
µ22G
0,1
00 − µ21
(µ0 − µ1)
(µ0 − µ2) G
0,2
00 + µ
2
0
(µ0 − µ1)
(µ1 − µ2) G
1,2
00 =
Y00
[
µ22(µ0 − µ1)2 − µ21(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2) + µ20(µ0 − µ1)(µ1 − µ2)
]
+
∞∑
m=3
Y0m
m!
[
µ22(µ1 − µ0)(µm0 µ1 − µ0µm1 ) + µ21(µ0 − µ1)(µm0 µ2 − µ0µm2 )− µ20(µ0 − µ1)(µm1 µ2 − µ1µm2 )
]
+
∞∑
n=3
Yn0
n!
[
µ22(µ1 − µ0)(µn0µ1 − µ0µn1 ) + µ21(µ0 − µ1)(µn0µ2 − µ0µn2 )− µ20(µ0 − µ1)(µn1µ2 − µ1µn2 )
]
+
∞∑
n,m=3
Ynm
n!m!
µ20µ
2
1µ
2
2
[
(µn−10 − µn−11 )(µm−10 − µm−11 )
− (µ0 − µ1)
(µ0 − µ2) (µ
n−1
0 − µn−12 )(µm−10 − µm−12 ) +
(µ0 − µ1)
(µ1 − µ2) (µ
n−1
1 − µn−12 )(µm−11 − µm−12 )
]
. (C.79)
In order to extract an upper bound on Y00 we need to study the sign of the yields’ coefficients. We start
by recasting the term corresponding to Y00 as:
Y00(µ0 − µ1)
[
µ22(µ0 − µ1)− µ21(µ0 − µ2) + µ20(µ1 − µ2)
]
= Y00(µ0 − µ1)2(µ1 − µ2)(µ0 − µ2) . (C.80)
We observe that the sign of this expression is determined by the factors (µ1 − µ2)(µ0 − µ2).
We then proceed by recasting each term of the sum corresponding to the Ynm, with n,m ≥ 3 in (C.79)
as:
Ynm
n!m!
A00(µ0, µ1, µ2,m) ·A00(µ0, µ1, µ2, n)
(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2) , (C.81)
where
A00(µ0, µ1, µ2,m) ≡ µm1 (µ22µ0 − µ2µ20) + µm2 (µ20µ1 − µ0µ21) + µm0 (µ21µ2 − µ1µ22) . (C.82)
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This factor can be rewritten as:
A00(µ0, µ1, µ2,m) = µ0µ1µ2
[
µm−11 (µ2 − µ0) + µm−12 (µ0 − µ1) + µm−10 (µ1 − µ2)
]
= −µ0µ1µ2A22(µ0, µ1, µ2,m− 1) , (C.83)
where A22 is defined as (C.11) in Appendix C.1. Thus we can use the result (C.12) obtained in Appendix
C.1 to directly recast A00 as:
A00(µ0, µ1, µ2,m) = µ0µ1µ2(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)
m−2∑
k=0
µk2(µ
m−2−k
0 − µm−2−k1 ) . (C.84)
By substituting (C.84) back into (C.81), we get the final expression for each term of the sum corresponding
to the Ynm, with n,m ≥ 3 in (C.79):
Ynm
n!m!
µ20µ
2
1µ
2
2(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)
[
m−2∑
k=0
µk2(µ
m−2−k
0 − µm−2−k1 )
][
n−2∑
k=0
µk2(µ
n−2−k
0 − µn−2−k1 )
]
. (C.85)
which has manifestly the same sign as the expression given by (C.80), for any value of the intensities
(the product of the last two factors is always positive).
Finally, we recast the Y0m’s terms (Yn0’s terms are identical under the replacement m→ n) as:
Y0m
m!
µ0µ1µ2(µ0 − µ1)
[
µ2(µ
m−1
1 − µm−10 ) + µ1(µm−10 − µm−12 )− µ0(µm−11 − µm−12 )
]
=
Y0m
m!
(µ0 − µ1)A00(µ0, µ1, µ2,m)
=
Y0m
m!
µ0µ1µ2(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)
m−2∑
k=0
µk2(µ
m−2−k
0 − µm−2−k1 ) , (C.86)
where we employed (C.83) in the first equality and (C.84) in the second one. We observe that the sign
of the Y0m’s terms is again determined by the factors (µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2).
We conclude that the coefficients of Y0m, Yn0 and Ynm, with n,m ≥ 3, carry the same sign as Y00’s, which
implies that a valid upper bound on Y00 is obtained by setting all the other yields to zero in (C.79). In
so doing, we find that:
Y U00 =
µ22G
0,1
00
µ0−µ1 −
µ21G
0,2
00
µ0−µ2 +
µ20G
1,2
00
µ1−µ2
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2) . (C.87)
Appendix D. Yields’ bounds with four decoys
Here we derive analytical upper bounds on the yields appearing in (1.7), following the same lines of
Sec. 2. In this case we assume that Alice and Bob can prepare their phase-randomized coherent pulses
with four different intensity settings: {µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3}, which are the same for both parties. This choice
is optimal since we assumed that the two optical channels linking the parties to the central node C have
equal transmittance
√
η [43].
The whole set of infinite yields is subjected to the following sixteen equality constraints:
Q˜k,l ≡ eµk+µlQk,l =
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
µk
nµl
m k, l ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} , (D.1)
and to the same inequality constraints given by (2.3).
In this appendix we only obtain bounds on the yields Y13, Y31, Y04 and Y40 since the bounds derived on
the yields Y00, Y11, Y02, Y20 and Y22 in Appendix C are already good enough, i.e bounding them with
one additional decoy intensity would not result in a significant improvement of the performance of the
protocol.
Appendix D.1. Upper bound on Y04
Consider the following combinations of gains in which all the terms Y1m and Yn0 are removed:
Gi,j04 = µjQ˜
i,i + µiQ˜
j,j − µjQ˜i,j − µiQ˜j,i =
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
(µjµ
n
i − µiµnj )(µmi − µmj ) , (D.2)
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where i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Since Gi,i04 = 0 and Gi,j04 = Gj,i04 , we only have six distinct combinations that read
(for j > i): G0,104 , G
0,2
04 , G
0,3
04 , G
1,2
04 , G
1,3
04 , G
2,3
04 .
We now take the linear combination of the Gi,j04 such that even the yields Y2m, Y3m, Yn1 and Yn2 are
removed: ∑
j>i
ci,jG
i,j
04 =
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
∑
j>i
ci,j(µjµ
n
i − µiµnj )(µmi − µmj ) , (D.3)
where we implicitly assume that both indexes i, j run over the set {0, 1, 2, 3}. For Y2m, Y3m, Yn1 and Yn2
to be removed, the real coefficients ci,j must satisfy:
∑
j>i ci,j(µjµ
2
i − µiµ2j )(µmi − µmj ) = 0 ∀m∑
j>i ci,j(µjµ
3
i − µiµ3j )(µmi − µmj ) = 0 ∀m∑
j>i ci,j(µjµ
n
i − µiµnj )(µi − µj) = 0 ∀n∑
j>i ci,j(µjµ
n
i − µiµnj )(µ2i − µ2j ) = 0 ∀n
(D.4)
In order to solve system (D.4), we look for those coefficients ci,j such that the multiplicative factors of
µmi and µ
n
i (for i = 0, 1, 2, 3) are all set to zero. This corresponds to imposing sixteen conditions on the
six coefficients ci,j . These conditions are not all independent, and a solution can be found even when we
require (for simplicity) that c0,1 = 1:
c0,1 = 1 ,
c0,2 = − (µ0 − µ1)µ1(µ1 − µ3)
(µ0 − µ2)µ2(µ2 − µ3) ,
c0,3 =
(µ0 − µ1)µ1(µ1 − µ2)
(µ0 − µ3)µ3(µ2 − µ3) ,
c1,2 =
(µ0 − µ1)µ0(µ0 − µ3)
(µ1 − µ2)µ2(µ2 − µ3) ,
c1,3 = − (µ0 − µ1)µ0(µ0 − µ2)
(µ1 − µ3)µ3(µ2 − µ3) ,
c2,3 =
µ0µ1(µ0 − µ1)2
µ2µ3(µ2 − µ3)2 . (D.5)
By substituting the solution for the coefficients given by (D.5) back into (D.3), one gets:∑
j>i
ci,jG
i,j
04 =
∞∑
m=3
Y0m
m!
A04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3,m) +
∞∑
n=4
m=3
Ynm
n!m!
B04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, n,m) , (D.6)
where:
A04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3,m) = − (µ0 − µ1)
µ2µ3(µ2 − µ3) [µ
m
0 (µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ3)(µ2 − µ3)− µm1 (µ0 − µ2)(µ0 − µ3)(µ2 − µ3)
+µm2 (µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ3)(µ1 − µ3)− µm3 (µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)]
= − (µ0 − µ1)
2(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)(µ0 − µ3)(µ1 − µ3)
µ2µ3
 ∑
i1≤i2≤...≤im−3
µi1µi2 · . . . · µim−3
 , (D.7)
and
B04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, n,m) =
−µ0µ1
(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ3)(µ0 − µ3)(µ2 − µ3)2 [µ
m
0 (µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ3)(µ2 − µ3)
−µm1 (µ0 − µ2)(µ0 − µ3)(µ2 − µ3) + µm2 (µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ3)(µ1 − µ3)− µm3 (µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)]
× [−µn−10 (µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ3)(µ2 − µ3) + µn−11 (µ0 − µ2)(µ0 − µ3)(µ2 − µ3)
−µn−12 (µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ3)(µ1 − µ3) + µn−13 (µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)
]
= −µ0µ1µ2µ3A04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3,m) ·
 ∑
i1≤i2≤...≤in−4
µi1µi2 · . . . · µin−4
 . (D.8)
In (D.7,D.8) we again assume that the indexes in the sums run over the set {0, 1, 2, 3} and we define∑
i1≤i2≤...≤im−3 µi1µi2 · . . . · µim−3 |m=3= 1. From (D.7) we deduce that the sign of Y0m’s coefficient is
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independent of m, while from (D.8) we deduce that Ynm’s coefficient has always opposite sign to that of
Y0m. Therefore a valid upper bound on Y04 is obtained by setting to zero all the other yields Y0m and
to 1 the yields Ynm with n ≥ 4 and m ≥ 3 in (D.6). We thus obtain:∑
j>i
ci,jG
i,j
04 =
Y U04
4!
A04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, 4) +
∞∑
n=4
m=3
B04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, n,m)
n!m!
, (D.9)
which implies the following upper bound on Y04:
Y U04 =
4!
A04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, 4)
∑
j>i
ci,jG
i,j
04 −
∞∑
n=4
m=3
B04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, n,m)
n!m!
 , (D.10)
where ci,j are given in (D.5), G
i,j
04 is defined in (D.2), the coefficient A04 reads:
A04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, 4) = − (µ0 − µ1)
2(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)(µ0 − µ3)(µ1 − µ3)(µ0 + µ1 + µ2 + µ3)
µ2µ3
, (D.11)
and the sum over the coefficient B04 reads:
∞∑
n=4
m=3
B04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, n,m)
n!m!
=
µ0µ1
(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ3)(µ0 − µ3)(µ2 − µ3)2
×
[
(eµ0 − 1− µ0 − µ
2
0
2
)(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ3)(µ2 − µ3)− (eµ1 − 1− µ1 − µ
2
1
2
)(µ0 − µ2)(µ0 − µ3)(µ2 − µ3)
+(eµ2 − 1− µ2 − µ
2
2
2
)(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ3)(µ1 − µ3)− (eµ3 − 1− µ3 − µ
2
3
2
)(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)
]2
.
(D.12)
Appendix D.2. Upper bound on Y40
Consider the following combinations of gains in which all the terms Y0m and Yn1 are removed:
Gi,j40 = µjQ˜
i,i + µiQ˜
j,j − µiQ˜i,j − µjQ˜j,i =
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
(µni − µnj )(µjµmi − µiµmj ) , (D.13)
where i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Since Gi,i40 = 0 and Gi,j40 = Gj,i40 , we only have six distinct combinations that read
(for j > i): G0,140 , G
0,2
40 , G
0,3
40 , G
1,2
40 , G
1,3
40 , G
2,3
40 .
We now take the linear combination of the Gi,j40 such that even the yields Y1m, Y2m, Yn2 and Yn3 are
removed: ∑
j>i
ci,jG
i,j
40 =
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
∑
j>i
ci,j(µ
n
i − µnj )(µjµmi − µiµmj ) , (D.14)
where we implicitly assume that both indexes i, j run over the set {0, 1, 2, 3}. For Y1m, Y2m, Yn2 and Yn3
to be removed, the real coefficients ci,j must satisfy:
∑
j>i ci,j(µ
n
i − µnj )(µjµ2i − µiµ2j ) = 0 ∀n∑
j>i ci,j(µ
n
i − µnj )(µjµ3i − µiµ3j ) = 0 ∀n∑
j>i ci,j(µi − µj)(µjµmi − µiµmj ) = 0 ∀m∑
j>i ci,j(µ
2
i − µ2j )(µjµmi − µiµmj ) = 0 ∀m.
(D.15)
We now notice that the system (D.15) is exactly the same system solved in Appendix D.2 while bounding
Y04, thus the solution for the coefficients ci,j is given in (D.5). By substituting the solution (D.5) back
into (D.14), one gets:∑
j>i
ci,jG
i,j
40 =
∞∑
n=3
Yn0
n!
A04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, n) +
∞∑
n=3
m=4
Ynm
n!m!
B04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3,m, n) , (D.16)
where A04 and B04 are the coefficients defined in (D.7,D.8) while bounding Y04. Hence we can adopt
the observations made on the sign of A04 and B04 from Appendix D.1 and conclude that a valid upper
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bound on Y40 is obtained by setting to zero all the other yields Yn0 and to 1 the yields Ynm with n ≥ 3
and m ≥ 4 in (D.16). The upper bound on Y40 then reads:
Y U40 =
4!
A04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, 4)
∑
j>i
ci,jG
i,j
40 −
∞∑
n=3
m=4
B04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3,m, n)
n!m!
 , (D.17)
where ci,j , G
i,j
40 , A04(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, 4) and the sum over B04 are given in (D.5), (D.13), (D.11) and (D.12),
respectively.
Appendix D.3. Upper bound on Y13
We consider the most general combination of all sixteen gains:
3∑
i,j=0
ci,jQ˜
i,j =
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
 3∑
i,j=0
ci,jµ
n
i µ
m
j
 , (D.18)
and require that the terms Yn0, Yn1, Yn2, Y0m, Y2m and Y3m are removed, by imposing proper conditions
on the real coefficients ci,j :
Yn0 removed:
3∑
i,j=0
ci,jµ
n
i = 0 ∀n ⇐
3∑
j=0
ci,j = 0 for i = 0, 1, 2, 3 (D.19)
Yn1 removed:
3∑
i,j=0
ci,jµ
n
i µj = 0 ∀n ⇐
3∑
j=0
ci,jµj = 0 for i = 0, 1, 2, 3 (D.20)
Yn2 removed:
3∑
i,j=0
ci,jµ
n
i µ
2
j = 0 ∀n ⇐
3∑
j=0
ci,jµ
2
j = 0 for i = 0, 1, 2, 3 (D.21)
Y0m removed:
3∑
i,j=0
ci,jµ
m
j = 0 ∀m ⇐
3∑
i=0
ci,j = 0 for j = 0, 1, 2, 3 (D.22)
Y2m removed:
3∑
i,j=0
ci,jµ
2
iµ
m
j = 0 ∀m ⇐
3∑
i=0
ci,jµ
2
i = 0 for j = 0, 1, 2, 3 (D.23)
Y3m removed:
3∑
i,j=0
ci,jµ
3
iµ
m
j = 0 ∀m ⇐
3∑
i=0
ci,jµ
3
i = 0 for j = 0, 1, 2, 3 . (D.24)
The twenty-four conditions given by (D.19 - D.24) form an over-determined system of equations for the
sixteen variables ci,j . However, thanks to the symmetries of the problem, a unique solution for ci,j exists
and reads (we rescale every coefficient by requiring c0,0 = 1):
c0,0 = 1 ,
c0,1 =
(µ0 − µ2)(µ0 − µ3)
(µ2 − µ1)(µ1 − µ3) ,
c0,2 =
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ3)
(µ1 − µ2)(µ2 − µ3) ,
c0,3 =
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)
(µ1 − µ3)(µ3 − µ2) ,
c1,0 = − (µ0 − µ2)(µ0 − µ3)[µ0(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3]
(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ3)[µ1(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3] ,
c1,1 =
(µ0 − µ2)2(µ0 − µ3)2[µ0(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3]
(µ1 − µ2)2(µ1 − µ3)2[µ1(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3] ,
c1,2 = − (µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(µ0 − µ3)
2[µ0(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3]
(µ1 − µ2)2(µ1 − µ3)(µ2 − µ3)[µ1(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3] ,
c1,3 =
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)2(µ0 − µ3)[µ0(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3]
(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ3)2(µ2 − µ3)[µ1(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3] ,
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c2,0 =
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ3)[µ0(µ1 + µ3) + µ1µ3]
(µ1 − µ2)(µ2 − µ3)[µ1(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3] ,
c2,1 = − (µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(µ0 − µ3)
2[µ0(µ1 + µ3) + µ1µ3]
(µ1 − µ2)2(µ1 − µ3)(µ2 − µ3)[µ1(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3] ,
c2,2 =
(µ0 − µ1)2(µ0 − µ3)2[µ0(µ1 + µ3) + µ1µ3]
(µ1 − µ2)2(µ2 − µ3)2[µ1(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3] ,
c2,3 = − (µ0 − µ1)
2(µ0 − µ2)(µ0 − µ3)[µ0(µ1 + µ3) + µ1µ3]
(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ3)(µ2 − µ3)2[µ1(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3] ,
c3,0 =
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)[µ0(µ1 + µ2) + µ1µ2]
(µ1 − µ3)(µ3 − µ2)[µ1(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3] ,
c3,1 =
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)2(µ0 − µ3)[µ0(µ1 + µ2) + µ1µ2]
(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ3)2(µ2 − µ3)[µ1(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3] ,
c3,2 = − (µ0 − µ1)
2(µ0 − µ2)(µ0 − µ3)[µ0(µ1 + µ2) + µ1µ2]
(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ3)(µ2 − µ3)2[µ1(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3] ,
c3,3 =
(µ0 − µ1)2(µ0 − µ2)2[µ0(µ1 + µ2) + µ1µ2]
(µ1 − µ3)2(µ2 − µ3)2[µ1(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3] . (D.25)
By substituting these expressions back into (D.18) and by making some simplifications, one gets:
3∑
i,j=0
ci,jQ˜
i,j =
∞∑
m=3
Y1m
m!
A13(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3,m) +
∞∑
n=4
m=3
Ynm
n!m!
A13(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3,m) · Cn , (D.26)
where:
A13(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3,m) =
(µ0 − µ1)2(µ0 − µ2)2(µ0 − µ3)2
µ2µ3 + µ1µ2 + µ1µ3
 ∑
i1≤i2≤...≤im−3
µi1µi2 · . . . · µim−3
 , (D.27)
and Cn (n ≥ 5) is defined recursively as:{
Cn =
[∑n−4
j=1 (µ
j
0 + µ
j
1 + µ
j
2 + µ
j
3)Cn−j − µ0µ1µ2µ3
(∑
i1≤i2≤...≤in−5 µi1µi2 · . . . · µin−5
)]
/(n− 4)
C4 = µ0µ1µ2 + µ0µ1µ3 + µ0µ2µ3 + µ1µ2µ3 .
(D.28)
In (D.27,D.28) we assume that the indexes ij in the sums run over the set {0, 1, 2, 3} and we define∑
i1≤i2≤...≤im−3 µi1µi2 · . . . · µim−3 |m=3= 1. From (D.27) we deduce that the sign of Y1m’s coefficient is
always positive, while from (D.28) we deduce that Ynm’s coefficient has always equal sign to that of Y1m,
since Cn is always a positive quantity. Therefore a valid upper bound on Y13 is obtained by setting to
zero all the other yields in (D.26). The upper bound on Y13 then reads:
Y U13 =
6
A13(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, 3)
 3∑
i,j=0
ci,jQ˜
i,j
 , (D.29)
where ci,j are defined in (D.25) and A13(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, 3) reads:
A13(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, 3) =
(µ0 − µ1)2(µ0 − µ2)2(µ0 − µ3)2
µ2µ3 + µ1µ2 + µ1µ3
. (D.30)
Appendix D.4. Upper bound on Y31
We consider the most general combination of all sixteen gains:
3∑
i,j=0
ci,jQ˜
i,j =
∞∑
n,m=0
Ynm
n!m!
 3∑
i,j=0
ci,jµ
n
i µ
m
j
 , (D.31)
and require that the terms Yn0, Yn2, Yn3, Y0m, Y1m and Y2m are removed, by imposing proper conditions
on the real coefficients ci,j :
Yn0 removed:
3∑
i,j=0
ci,jµ
n
i = 0 ∀n ⇐
3∑
j=0
ci,j = 0 for i = 0, 1, 2, 3 (D.32)
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Yn2 removed:
3∑
i,j=0
ci,jµ
n
i µ
2
j = 0 ∀n ⇐
3∑
j=0
ci,jµ
2
j = 0 for i = 0, 1, 2, 3 (D.33)
Yn3 removed:
3∑
i,j=0
ci,jµ
n
i µ
3
j = 0 ∀n ⇐
3∑
j=0
ci,jµ
3
j = 0 for i = 0, 1, 2, 3 (D.34)
Y0m removed:
3∑
i,j=0
ci,jµ
m
j = 0 ∀m ⇐
3∑
i=0
ci,j = 0 for j = 0, 1, 2, 3 (D.35)
Y1m removed:
3∑
i,j=0
ci,jµiµ
m
j = 0 ∀m ⇐
3∑
i=0
ci,jµi = 0 for j = 0, 1, 2, 3 (D.36)
Y2m removed:
3∑
i,j=0
ci,jµ
2
iµ
m
j = 0 ∀m ⇐
3∑
i=0
ci,jµ
2
i = 0 for j = 0, 1, 2, 3 . (D.37)
The twenty-four conditions (D.32 - D.37) form an over-determined system of equations for the sixteen
variables ci,j . However, thanks to the symmetries of the problem, a unique solution for ci,j exists and
reads (we rescale every coefficient by requiring c0,0 = 1):
c0,0 = 1 ,
c0,1 = − (µ0 − µ2)(µ0 − µ3)[µ0(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3]
(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ3)[µ1(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3] ,
c0,2 =
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ3)[µ0(µ1 + µ3) + µ1µ3]
(µ1 − µ2)(µ2 − µ3)[µ1(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3] ,
c0,3 =
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)[µ0(µ1 + µ2) + µ1µ2]
(µ1 − µ3)(µ3 − µ2)[µ1(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3] ,
c1,0 =
(µ0 − µ2)(µ0 − µ3)
(µ2 − µ1)(µ1 − µ3) ,
c1,1 =
(µ0 − µ2)2(µ0 − µ3)2[µ0(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3]
(µ1 − µ2)2(µ1 − µ3)2[µ1(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3] ,
c1,2 = − (µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(µ0 − µ3)
2[µ0(µ1 + µ3) + µ1µ3]
(µ1 − µ2)2(µ1 − µ3)(µ2 − µ3)[µ1(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3] ,
c1,3 =
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)2(µ0 − µ3)[µ0(µ1 + µ2) + µ1µ2]
(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ3)2(µ2 − µ3)[µ1(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3] ,
c2,0 =
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ3)
(µ1 − µ2)(µ2 − µ3) ,
c2,1 = − (µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)(µ0 − µ3)
2[µ0(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3]
(µ1 − µ2)2(µ1 − µ3)(µ2 − µ3)[µ1(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3] ,
c2,2 =
(µ0 − µ1)2(µ0 − µ3)2[µ0(µ1 + µ3) + µ1µ3]
(µ1 − µ2)2(µ2 − µ3)2[µ1(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3] ,
c2,3 = − (µ0 − µ1)
2(µ0 − µ2)(µ0 − µ3)[µ0(µ1 + µ2) + µ1µ2]
(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ3)(µ2 − µ3)2[µ1(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3] ,
c3,0 =
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)
(µ1 − µ3)(µ3 − µ2) ,
c3,1 =
(µ0 − µ1)(µ0 − µ2)2(µ0 − µ3)[µ0(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3]
(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ3)2(µ2 − µ3)[µ1(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3] ,
c3,2 = − (µ0 − µ1)
2(µ0 − µ2)(µ0 − µ3)[µ0(µ1 + µ3) + µ1µ3]
(µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ3)(µ2 − µ3)2[µ1(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3] ,
c3,3 =
(µ0 − µ1)2(µ0 − µ2)2[µ0(µ1 + µ2) + µ1µ2]
(µ1 − µ3)2(µ2 − µ3)2[µ1(µ2 + µ3) + µ2µ3] . (D.38)
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By substituting these expressions back into (D.31) and by making some simplifications, one gets:
3∑
i,j=0
ci,jQ˜
i,j =
∞∑
n=3
Yn1
n!
A13(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, n) +
∞∑
n=3
m=4
Ynm
n!m!
A13(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, n) · Cm , (D.39)
where A13 and Cm also appear in Appendix D.3 when bounding Y13 and are defined as (D.27) and (D.28),
respectively. Thus, following the same lines of Appendix D.3, we conclude that all yields in (D.39) are
multiplied by a positive factor. A valid upper bound on Y31 is then obtained by setting to zero all the
other yields in (D.39). We obtain:
Y U31 =
6
A13(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, 3)
 3∑
i,j=0
ci,jQ˜
i,j
 , (D.40)
where ci,j and A13(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, 3) are defined in (D.38) and (D.30), respectively.
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